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IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS
FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THEORY?
INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'
Like much of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment guarantees
freedoms that Americans cherish. Unlike many other amendments,
the values safeguarded by the First Amendment sometimes come into
conflict. 2 In particular, free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech sometimes conflict with freedom from the establishment of re-
ligion. These First Amendment freedoms frequently conflict in lim-
ited public forums.3
In a recent Supreme Court decision, Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, the Court purported to resolve the conflict among the
circuit courts on whether governments can exclude speech from lim-
ited public forums due to the religious nature of the speech.4 The
Court's decision raises questions about the traditional rules of forum
analysis with respect to religion. This Note will address how the Su-
preme Court handled First Amendment conflicts historically, how the
1. U.S. CONs-r. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states, and therefore to munici-
palities that gain their authority from the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment. Section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States: nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law: nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see also Douglas Linder, The Incorporation
Debate, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/home.htm (last visited June 9.
2002).
2. For a number of interesting Constitutional questions, see Douglas Linder, Exploring Con-
stitutional Conflicts, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/home.htm (last
visited June 9, 2002).
3. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing limited public forums). See also
cases discussed beginning infra note 121 and accompanying text.
4. 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2099 (2001). Three circuit court decisions, Gentala v. Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065
(9th Cir. 2001). Campbell v. St. Tammany's School Board. 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000), and
Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School District No. 10. 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
were called into question by the Court's decision in Good News.
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Supreme Court currently handles such conflicts, and analyzes whether
current Establishment Clause theory sufficiently protects those free-
doms we value so highly. Simply put, what happens when these First
Amendment rights conflict?
Part II examines the dangers of silencing speech, 5 the effect of the
type of forum on free speech rights,6 the dangers of, and tests for,
establishment, 7 and the state of the law of exclusion of religion from
limited public forums before Good News.8 Part III summarizes the
Good News case. 9 Part IV explores free speech and Establishment
Clause implications raised by the Good News decision, particularly
with regard to the appellate court cases that prompted the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari.' 0 Part V suggests what might happen when
the Supreme Court is confronted with a case in which it finds that free
speech conflicts with the Establishment Clause.1" Finally, Part VI
concludes that although Good News was not decided on Establish-
ment Clause grounds, by allowing more religious speech into limited
public forums, it will soon drive the Court to decide whether the Es-
tablishment Clause can justify viewpoint discrimination in limited
public forums. 12
II. BACKGROUND
This section addresses the state of the law regarding the exclusion
of religious speech from limited public forums before the Good News
decision. In order to do so, the concepts of viewpoint and content
discrimination, 13 types of forums and the rules that apply thereto,14
and the Establishment Clause 15 are discussed. Finally, the cases that
prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Good News are
summarized. 16
5. See infra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 75-120 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 121-245 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 246-320 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 321-459 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 461-483 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 484-493 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 75-120 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 179-245 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52:125
IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS?
A. The Danger of Silencing Speech: Subject Matter and
Viewpoint Discrimination
The framers of the Constitution recognized that freedom of speech
would protect and promote a democratic form of government. 17 Ad-
ditionally, freedom of speech fosters self-fulfillment, intellectual de-
velopment, and a free trade of ideas that allows society to progress
toward greater achievements and tolerance. 8 These values are prized
so highly by a free society, it is little wonder that freedom of speech is
embodied in the very first Amendment.
While some believe that "Congress shall make no law" is absolute, 19
the Supreme Court has held that government may abridge the free-
dom of speech under some circumstances.20 Content-neutral restric-
tions, such as a restriction on the volume at which speech may be
broadcast in a neighborhood, 2' are generally less controversial than
content-based restrictions.22 However, even with respect to content-
based restrictions, the Supreme Court has identified some types of
speech, for instance obscenity or commercial advertising, which may
not significantly advance First Amendment values. 23 As such, the
Court has tolerated some content-based restrictions on speech.
24
Content-based restrictions are further divided between restrictions
based merely on subject matter and those based on viewpoint. Gener-
ally, subject matter restrictions, such as restrictions on commercial
17. See Steven D. Smith, Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 348, 351 (1995) (stating that "[t]he core idea of [the 'democracy'] rationale is that our
political community is founded on a commitment to democratic government, and democratic
government is possible only when citizens are free to speak their minds on political issues."). See
also Jason Schlosberg, Judgement on "Nuremberg": An Analysis of Free Speech and Anti-Abor-
tion Threats Made on the Internet, 7 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 52, 56-57 (2001).
18. See Sarah Hudleston, Preserving Free Speech in a Global Courtroom: The Proposed Hague
Convention and the First Amendment, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 403, n.123 (2001): Julien
Mailland. Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs of Control: the French Example, 33
N.Y.U. J. IN'r'L L. & POL. 1179, 1183 (2001): Schlosberg. supra note 17. at 56-57 n.28-29.
19. For example. this was Justice Black's position. See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960), in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1073 (3d
ed., Aspen Law & Business 1996) (noting that, "the decision to provide a constitutional safe-
guard for . . . free speech . . . involves a balancing of conflicting interests. [But] the Framers
themselves did this balancing when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights ....
Courts have neither the right nor the power [to] make a different evaluation .... ").
20. See. e.g., Elrod v. Burns. 427 U.S. 347. 360 (1976) (holding that the freedom of speech may
be abridged "for appropriate reasons"). in STONE, supra note 19, at 1073.
21. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
22. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47-50 (1987).
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id. Specifically. the Court has tolerated restrictions on obscenity, commercial advertising.
and false statements of fact, all of which the Court usually holds are only marginally protected by
the First Amendment. Id.
2002]
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speech, may be permissible if the restriction is narrowly tailored and is
necessary to serve a compelling government interest.2 5 While the dis-
tinction between viewpoint and subject matter discrimination is not
precise, 26 viewpoint discrimination only serves to silence an unpopular
or "dangerous" point of view on an otherwise permissible subject.2 7
As such, viewpoint discrimination directly conflicts with values under-
lying the First Amendment. The government may not restrict speech
on the basis of viewpoint because to do so would allow the govern-
ment to skew public debate.28
B. Government Speech
Although the government generally cannot restrict private speech
based on viewpoint, even if the government subsidizes the private
speech,29 the government can express, and thereby discriminate
against, viewpoint when speaking for itself.3 ) However, not every
message "authorized by a government policy and tak[ing] place on
25. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788. 800 (1985). With re-
spect to speech restrictions in limited public forums, the Court should look to whether the dis-
tinction is reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum. Id. at 804-06.
26. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819. 830-31 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 834.
30. Id. See also Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1072-73.
[T]he situation here fits into an entirely different mode of First Amendment speech
analysis, applicable when the government is in some measure engaged in communica-
tive activity, as it was in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)
(government as patron), Arkansas Educ. Television Corm'n v. Forbes. 523 U.S. 666
(1998) (government as editor), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (govern-
ment as policy proponent). In all of those cases, some degree of viewpoint or qualita-
tive selection criteria were permitted because the government was engaged not simply
in providing a forum for private speech but in forwarding its own program through the
speech of others.
Id. (parallel citations omitted); See also Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533. 541-42
(2001) (suggesting that if the public does not care for the government's message. the public could
vote the representatives out of office). The Court stated:
We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in
which the government is itself the speaker, or instances .. .in which the government
'used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program."
As we said in Rosenberger. "[w]hen the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message. it may take legitimate and appropriate
steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." The
latitude which may exist for restrictions on speech where the government's own mes-
sage is being delivered flows in part from our observation that, "[w]hen the government
speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in
the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary
position."
Id. (citations omitted).
2002] IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS?
government property at [a] government-sponsored .. .[event] .. .is
the government's own. [The Court has] held, for example, that an
individual's contribution to a government-created forum was not gov-
ernment speech. ' 31 Furthermore, although the government may ex-
press a viewpoint, the Establishment Clause forbids governments
from expressing or endorsing a religious message. 32
C. The Effect of the Type of Forum on First Amendment Freedoms
Although the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech,
freedom to exercise religion, and freedom to assemble, it does not
guarantee all citizens unrestricted access to exercise these rights on or
through government property. 33 Like a private property owner, the
government may lawfully limit the public's use of its property, includ-
ing private parties' right to speak on government property. 34 The ex-
tent to which citizens may "speak on government property is largely
dependent on the nature of the forum in which the speech is
delivered. 35
In Perry Educators' Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,36 the
Supreme Court delineated three forums for speech used in free
speech analysis: the traditional public forum, the limited public forum,
and the nonpublic forum. 37 Depending on the type of forum, courts
31. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (citing Rosenberger, 515
U.S. 819 (1995)).
32. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
33. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
34. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
35. Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2000). As stated in
Cornelius:
[T]he conclusion that the solicitation, which occurs in the CFC. is protected speech
merely begins our inquiry. Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all
places and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to
grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of
Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption
that might be caused by the speaker's activities. Recognizing that the Government. 'no
less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,' the Court has adopted a forum
analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use
of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the
property for other purposes. Accordingly, the extent to which the Government can
control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.
Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 799-800 (citations omitted).
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. Id. at 44. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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apply different standards to determine whether a government may
constitutionally exclude a speaker. 38
1. Traditional Public Forum
Traditional public forums, also called open forums, include streets,
parks, and other places that "by long tradition ... have been devoted
to assembly and debate. '39 In a traditional public forum, government
may restrict speech based on subject matter,40 but all such restrictions
are "subject to the highest scrutiny."' 4' In the case of a traditional
public forum, restrictions on speech must be both narrowly drawn and
necessary to serve a compelling state interest.42 Restrictions on view-
point in a traditional public forum, however, are never
constitutional. 43
One example of a traditional public forum is the street corner. In
Schneider v. State,44 defendants challenged the constitutionality of or-
dinances against handing out leaflets on public streets. 45 The restric-
tions were content-neutral, applying regardless of the leaflet's subject
matter.46 The Court assumed the ordinances were enacted for the le-
gitimate governmental goal of reducing litter;47 however, it held the
ordinances unconstitutional, stating that leaflets handed out on public
streets had been the "historical weapons in defense of liberty. ' '48 The
Court noted that pamphlets are the "most effective instruments in the
dissemination of opinion" 49 and "streets [are] natural and proper
places for the dissemination of information and opinion. '50
2. Limited Public Forum
Limited public forums are "created by government designation of a
place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for
38. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099-2100. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 44 (describing three types
of fora).
39. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
40. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (plurality opinion); Perry, 460
U.S. at 46.
41. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
42. See id.: Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
43. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See also supra notes 17-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the dangers of silencing speech).
44. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
45. Id. at 153-54.
46. Id. at 154-58.
47. Id. at 162.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 164.
50. Schnieder, 308 U.S. at 163.
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assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion
of certain subjects."' 51 In determining whether government intended
to create a nontraditional public forum, courts look to government
policy and practice. 52 While traditional public forums are exclusively
physical forums, such as parks and sidewalks, limited public forums
take a variety of forms. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univer-
sity of Virginia,53 the Supreme Court determined that a university's
student activities fund was a limited public forum, even while it noted
the fund was a forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or
geographic sense." '54
When a state establishes a limited public forum, "the State may be
justified 'in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discus-
sion of certain topics;" 55 therefore, content discrimination may be
51. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Government action is required to create a nontraditional pub-
lic forum. Id. Inaction is not sufficient. Id.
[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned or controlled by the government. [The Supreme Court] will not find that a
public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will
[it] infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity.
Id. at 803 (citations omitted).
52. Id.
In Perry Education Ass'n, [the Supreme Court] found that the School District's internal
mail system was not a public forum. In contrast to the general access policy in Widmar
v. Vincent, school board policy did not grant general access to the school mail system.
The practice was to require permission from the individual school principal before ac-
cess to the system to communicate with teachers was granted. Similarly, the evidence
in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights revealed that the city intended to limit access to
the advertising spaces on city transit buses. It had done so for 26 years, and its manage-
ment contract required the managing company to exercise control over the subject mat-
ter of the displays. Additionally, the Court found that the city's use of the property as a
commercial enterprise was inconsistent with an intent to designate the car cards as a
public forum. In cases where the principal function of the property would be disrupted
by expressive activity, the Court is particularly reluctant to hold that the government
intended to designate a public forum. Accordingly, [the Court] ha[s] held that military
reservations and jailhouse grounds do not constitute public fora.
Id. at 803-04 (citations omitted).
53. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See also infra notes 143-176 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Rosenberger decision).
54. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801, stating that:
[lin defining the forum [the Court has] focused on the access sought by the speaker.
When speakers seek general access to public property, the forum encompasses that
property. In cases in which limited access is sought, [the Court's] cases have taken a
more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of
the government property.
Id. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (1983) (stating that the relevant forum is the school's inter-
nal mail system): Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights. 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974) (holding that the
forum is the advertising spaces on the city buses).
55. Good News, 121 S. Ct. 2093. 2100 (2001) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).
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permissible if it preserves the purposes of the limited public forum.56
Nevertheless, restrictions on speech in a limited public forum must not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint and must be reasonable 57 in
light of the purpose served by the forum.58 With respect to religious
speech, the Supreme Court has indicated that State interest in avoid-
ing an Establishment Clause violation may justify content discrimina-
tion, but whether such an interest might justify viewpoint
discrimination is far from clear. 59
3. Nonpublic or Closed Forum
"A nonpublic forum is government property that has not been
opened for public speech either by tradition or by designation. '60 "In
such a forum, the government may make 'distinctions in access on the
basis of subject matter and speaker identity,"' but not on viewpoint. 61
The internal mail system at a school in Perry62 is an example of a
nonpublic forum. 63 The mail system was intended for the communica-
tion of school-related matters to school employees. 64 Because by pol-
icy or practice, the Perry School District had not opened its mail
system for indiscriminate use by the general public, the court held that
a public forum had not been created, although the school had allowed
"the periodic use of the system by private non-school ... connected
groups. '65 Having found that the mail system was not a public forum,
56. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.
57. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 683 (holding that "the restriction 'need
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation"')
(quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 736). The reasonableness inquiry looks to whether the restriction
on speech serves a significant government interest "and [is] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. If the justifica-
tions given are facially reasonable, the Court must still determine whether the proffered reasons
are mere pretext for viewpoint discrimination. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.
58. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100.
59. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993) (noting the suggestion in Widmar but ulti-
mately not finding an Establishment Clause problem). As "[v]iewpoint discrimination is 'an
egregious form of content discrimination . .."' if it is constitutional at all, "[t]he government
[would bear] a particularly heavy burden in justifying viewpoint-based restrictions in designated
public forums." Church on the Rock v. City of Alburquerque. 84 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir.
1996) (internal citations omitted).
60. Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 212 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
61. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49). See Cornelius. 473 U.S. 806 (favoring prohibition on
restriction based on viewpoint).
62. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
63. Id. at 46-47.
64. Id. at 47 (stating selective access does not transform government property into a public
forum.").
65. Id.
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"the School District had no 'constitutional obligation per se to let any
organization use the school mail boxes."' 66
D. Religion as Speech
Regardless of the forum, religious worship and discussion are forms
of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. 67 The
Supreme Court "has rejected the notion that speech about religion...
should be treated differently under the First Amendment. ' 68 Addi-
tionally, all members of the Court hold that "religious speech de-
signed to win converts and religious worship by persons already
converted" are entitled to protection under the First Amendment, but
disagreed as to the extent.69 Finally, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, the Court specifically rejected as
a defense for religious viewpoint discrimination the fear that opening
the forum to a "radical" church "might cause unrest," stating that
"[t]here is nothing in the record to support such a justification, which
in any event would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the pres-
entation of a religious point of view about a subject the district other-
wise opens to discussion on district property. ''70
Permission to use the system to communicate with teachers must be secured from the
individual building principal. There is no court finding or evidence in the record, which
demonstrates that this permission has been granted as a matter of course to all who
seek to distribute material. We can only conclude that the schools do allow some
outside organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other civic and church orga-
nizations to use the facilities. This type of selective access does not transform govern-
ment property into a public forum. In Greer v. Spock. the fact that other civilian
speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not
convert the military base into a public forum.
Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 48 (citing Conn. St. Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 481
(2d Cir. 1976)).
67. See Widmar. 454 U.S. at 269.
68. Church on the Rock. 84 F.3d at 1278 (citing Widmar. 454 U.S. at 269 n.6).
69. Id.
70. See Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 394-96. See also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.
505 U.S. 123. 134 (1992) (holding an assembly and parade ordinance that varied the fee for the
activity based on the content of the speech unconstitutional). The Court in Forsyth Coiunty
stated:
The fee assessed will depend on the administrator's measure of the amount of hostility
likely to be created by the speech based on its content. Those wishing to express views
unpopular with bottle throwers, for example. may have to pay more for their permit.
Although petitioner agrees that the cost of policing relates to content, it contends that
the ordinance is content neutral because it is aimed only at a secondary effect-the cost
of maintaining public order. It is clear, however, that. in this case, it cannot be said that
the fee's justification "has nothing to do with content."
Forsyth Count'. 505 U.S. at 134. While the argument that the opening of a forum to a "radical"
church "might cause unrest" cannot be used to allow viewpoint discrimination, there may be
good reason to fear unchecked religious fervor. Id. The use of religion by the Nazis in pre-
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Although the Supreme Court has recognized that religious speech
may be protected, and when religious speech constitutes worship, en-
joys the protection of the Free Exercise Clause as well, historically the
Court recognized a distinction between religious viewpoint and relig-
ious subject matter.71 This suggests government could place restric-
tions on limited public forums to allow religious viewpoint but
disallow religious subject matter, such as religious worship.72 The
Court has always recognized that this line is difficult to draw;73 how-
ever, where the line is drawn has a great effect on how the Establish-
ment Clause interacts with freedom of speech and freedom of religion
in limited public forums.74
E. The Establishment Clause and Free Speech and Free Exercise in
Limited Public Forums
The Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized that a state's inter-
est in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may justify content-
based discrimination. 75 What is less clear is whether a state's interest
in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint
discrimination. 76
"[T]he Constitution also requires that we keep in mind 'the myriad,
subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded.'" 77
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I),78 the Supreme Court set out a
three-part test for determining whether a statute constitutes govern-
ment establishment of religion. 79 Under the first prong, a statute must
have a "secular legislative purpose." 80 Second, the statute's "principal
World War II Germany, as well as the use of religion by the Taliban in more recent times, are
just two examples. However, fears about religion leading toward a totalitarian governmental
regime should be largely allayed by protecting the freedom of speech and enforcing the Estab-
lishment Clause.
71. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (both holding
that the restrictions in question were invalid because they discriminated against religious
viewpoint).
72. Id.
73. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
74. See infra notes 392-409 and 461 and accompanying text.
75. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2103 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271).
76. Id. (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95). The Court in Good News did not need to
decide the issue because it found that the school district had not raised an Establishment Clause
concern. Id. See infra notes 246-320 and accompanying text (discussing the Good News
decision).
77. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
78. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
79. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
80. Id. at 612.
[Vol. 52:125
2002] IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS?
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion."81 Finally, the statute must not foster an "excessive government
entanglement with religion. '"82
Although decided in 1971, the Lemon test has not been consistently
applied by the Court.8 3 Furthermore, the test has been criticized by
members of the Court, as well as academia, as being too malleable.
84
The Lemon test has not been explicitly used by the Court since 1985.85
Even when the Court purported to apply the Lemon test, it looked to
specific factors to decide whether a government action violated the
Establishment Clause. 86 Most notably, the Court consistently re-
turned to the factors of government neutrality toward religion, gov-
ernment funding of religion, and government endorsement of
religion.87
1. Neutrality
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "a significant factor
in upholding governmental programs against Establishment Clause at-
tack is their neutrality towards religion." 88 It has further clarified that
81. Id.
82. Id. at 613 (internal citations omitted).
83. See Julie F. Mead & Julie K. Underwood, Lemon Distilled with Four Votes: An Examina-
tion of Mitchell v. Helms and Its Implications, 149 ED. LAw REP. 639. 651-52 (2001): Marjorie
George. And Then God Created Kansas? The Evolution/Creationism Debate in America's Public
Schools, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 843. 855-56 (2001).
84. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited
opinions of Justices Kennedy. Rehnquist, White. and O'Connor, as well as one of his prior opin-
ions, all of which criticized the Lemon test. Id. See also George. supra note 83. at 855 n.73
(citing scholars who suggest the Court should reject Lemon). See also Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of
Educ. v. Freiler. 120 S. Ct. 2706. 2708 (2000) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the
denial of certiorari because he wanted to "take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once and
for all.").
85. See STONE. supra note 19, at 1547.
86. See Mitchell v. Helms. 530 U.S. 793, 836-51 (2000) (O'Connor, J.. concurring) (reviewing
numerous Establishment Clause cases pointing to factors used in deciding whether the action in
question constituted impermissible government establishment of religion).
87. See id.: Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 840-43. Additionally. the Court has sometimes hinted
that age may be a factor. But see Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2104-05, stating:
Whatever significance we may have assigned in the Establishment Clause context to the
suggestion that elementary school children are more impressionable than adults. cf.,
e.g., Lee [v. Weisman] at 592: Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373. 390
(1985) (stating that 'symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to
influence children of tender years. whose experience is limited and whose beliefs conse-
quently are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice'), we
have never extended our Establishment Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private relig-
ious conduct during nonschool hours merely because it takes place on school premises
where elementary school children may be present.
/d.
88. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2104 (quoting Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 839).
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"neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, follow-
ing neutral criteria and even-handed policies, extends benefits to re-
cipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are
broad and diverse.
8 9
Although government neutrality toward religion is "an important
consideration in Establishment Clause cases," 90 the Court has never
held that it is a dispositive factor.91 Recently, in Mitchell v. Helms,92 a
majority of the Court determined neutrality is not sufficient to uphold
government programs against an Establishment Clause attack. 93
In Mitchell, the Court held that a federal program, 94 under which
local agencies receiving federal funding lent educational materials to
both public and private schools, did not violate the Establishment
Clause even though most of the private schools receiving aid in the
locality in question were religious. 95 Although the plurality suggested
that neutrality alone was sufficient, five Justices in concurrence and
dissent agreed that "[n]eutrality ... is relevant ... but this neutrality
is not alone sufficient to qualify the [government] aid as
constitutional." 96
2. Funding and Coercion
Government may not fund religion because such funding may co-
erce citizens to subsidize religious ideas in which they do not believe. 97
Although the presence or absence of compulsion to attend an event
with religious overtones is important to the analysis,98 "[tjhe Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits the expenditure of government funds to aid
in the establishment of religion even if the only coercion involved is in
the collection of taxes to be used for that purpose." 99
89. Id.
90. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1075.
91. See id. at 1075-76 (discussing the Court's struggle to determine whether neutrality toward
religion alone is sufficient to deem a governmental program constitutional where subsidies are
concerned). See also Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 839.
92. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
93. See Gentala. 244 F.3d at 1075-76.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 70, VI (2002).
95. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836.
96. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
97. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1076 n.16 (citing Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) and Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 1. 15-16 (1941)).
98, See Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that prayers led by clergy at public high school
graduations violated the Establishment Clause as it coerced students to participate in religious
exercises).
99, DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Flast, 392
U.S. at 103). In DeStefano a taxpayer alleged that the state's funding of a private alcoholic
treatment center that included Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) as part of its services violated the
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Government funding may take the form of subsidies or tax exemp-
tions. With respect to subsidies, the Court has noted that, by provid-
ing a vehicle for speech, the limited public forum is analogous to
government subsidies for speech. As such, the court has applied the
same limitations on permissible restrictions developed in Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenberger. °00 However, the Court has made clear that
"if the State pays a church's bills it is subsidizing it, and we must guard
against this abuse."101 Thus general subsidies of religious activity are
impermissible. t0 2 When the subsidy is not specifically subsidizing re-
ligious activity, a fact specific inquiry is necessary to determine
whether an objective, informed observer10 3 would perceive the sub-
sidy as endorsement. 1114
Unlike general subsidies, tax exemptions provide economic assis-
tance in a "fundamentally different way." °10 5 Subsidies use "resources
exacted from taxpayers as a whole" whereas "exemptions ... involve
no such transfer." 11 6 "In the case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly
diverts the income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches,
[while] [i]n the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from
diverting to its own uses income independently generated by the
churches through voluntary contributions." °10 7
Although tax exemptions differ from subsidies, they may still vio-
late the Establishment Clause. However, in Walz v. Tax Commission
of New York, t08 the Court found that the breadth of a property tax
Establishment Clause. [d. Applying the Lemon test, the Second Circuit held that the AA pro-
grams constituted religion for purpose of the First Amendment, but that mere inclusion of ser-
vices did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
100. See Velazquez. 531 U.S. at 544-45 (holding that a funding restriction violated the First
Amendment because the program in question was designed to facilitate private speech, not to
promote a governmental message). See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing
government speech). See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing rules applicable
to limited public forums).
101. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844.
102. See id.: Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841.
103. A "reasonable person" who is familiar with the program.
104. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308. Funding and endorsement concerns often overlap because
government endorsement often also involves money in some form (a funding concern), and gov-
ernment funding is often accompanied by the government stamp of approval (an endorsement
concern). However, it is possible to isolate the concerns, although in reality it rarely happens.
The government is capable of endorsing without providing a subsidy or exemption from taxation
(therefore no funding concern), or funding an activity without the public being aware of the state
sponsorship (therefore no endorsement concern).
105. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.. 397 U.S. 664. 690 (1970).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 691 (quoting Donald Giannella. Religious Liberty. Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development. 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 553 (1968)).
108. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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exemption scheme, which included educational and charitable groups
in addition to religious groups, indicated that the state did not intend
to give religious organizations that benefited by the tax exemption
special preference. 10 9 As such, the Court found the tax exemption
scheme was neutral with respect to religion. 01
3. Endorsement and Coercion
Government may not endorse one religion over another or religion
over nonreligion. 111 An extreme example of government endorse-
ment is when government attempts to coerce citizens to participate in
religious exercises. In Lee v. Weisman,1 12 the Court held that a prayer
at a public middle school graduation was "forbidden by the Establish-
ment Clause. ' 113 Recognizing "the undeniable fact.., that the school
district's supervision and control of a . . . graduation ceremony places
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to
stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction," the Court stated:
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise
of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed
by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a mini-
mum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or other-
wise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so. '114
Simply because a majority of the electorate has approved a religious
message does not override endorsement concerns to protect such mes-
sage from Establishment Clause challenges. 1 5 In Santa Fe Indepen-
dent School District v. Doe,' 16 the Court held a high school policy,
which authorized a student election, the winner of which would lead a
prayer at school football games, violated the Establishment Clause.11 7
Because the school authorized the election and the speech took place
on school property at school events, the Court held that the speech
was government-endorsed, rather than purely private speech.1 18 The
Court stated:
109. Id. at 689.
110. Id.
111. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687. 703 (1994).
112. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
113. Id. at 599.
114. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
115. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304-05.
116. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
117. Id. at 317.
118. Id. at 302-03.
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[SItudent elections that determine, by majority vote, which expres-
sive activities shall receive or not receive school benefits are consti-
tutionally problematic: To the extent the referendum substitutes
majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would under-
mine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole
theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated
with the same respect as are majority views. Access to a public fo-
rum, for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent. That
principle is controlling here. 19
Although some religious speech may raise significant endorsement
concerns, not all religious speech, or even religious worship, in public
forums raise such concerns.' 20
F. Exclusion of Religion From Limited Public Forums Before
Good News
Even before the Good News decision, the Supreme Court had twice
addressed the question of religious speech in limited public forums.
12 1
In Lamb's Chapel, decided in 1993, the Court held the exclusion of
religious speech from the limited public forum in question was imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination, and such discrimination was not
justified by the government interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation. 122
Following Lamb's Chapel, two circuits decided cases finding the ex-
clusion of religious speech from limited public forums constituted im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination. 123 In contrast, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bronx Household held that
119. Id. at 304 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). In Santa Fe,
the Court further stated that "fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote: they depend on
the outcome of no elections." Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 638
(1943)). Notice that government can discriminate against viewpoint when it speaks for itself.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. However, majoritarian politics is a concern when
government endorses religion.
120. See, e.g.. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). Here,
the court held that the Establishment Clause was:
[N]ot implicated [because of] the presence here of the factors the Court considered
determinative in striking down state restrictions on religious content in Lamb's Chapel
and Widmar. The State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the expression was
made on government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and
permission was requested through the same application process and on the same terms
required of other private groups. [T]his Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
[has] consistently upheld neutral government policies that happen to benefit religion.
i.
121. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995): Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
122. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
123. See Church on the Rock v. Alburquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996): Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.. 28 F.3d 1501 (2d Cir. 2000).
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a school district had properly denied a church access to a limited pub-
lic forum because the proposed purpose, presenting the church's
weekly religious services, constituted subject matter rather than view-
point discrimination. 24
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Rosenberger, again
finding the exclusion of religious speech from the limited public forum
in question to constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination, but
reasserting that viewpoint discrimination might be justified in other
cases by the government's interest in preventing an Establishment
Clause violation. 25 After Rosenberger, two more circuits found no
viewpoint discrimination or justifiable viewpoint discrimination in the
exclusion of religious speech from limited public forums. 126
The following sections describe the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger and the split in the circuits that gave
rise to the Supreme Court granting certiorari in Good News.
1. Unconstitutional Exclusion of Religion From Limited Public
Forums
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger are recent and prominent Supreme
Court cases dealing with the exclusion of religious speech from limited
public forums.1 27 In each, the Supreme Court found the exclusion
amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 128
a. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District2 9
Under Section 414 of a New York statute, 130 school boards could
adopt regulations to allow community members to use the school for
specified purposes while the school was not being used for school pur-
poses.13 1 Religious purposes were not included among those specified
purposes.1 32 Pursuant to Section 414, the school district in Lamb's
Chapel specified a subset of the purposes enumerated in Section 414
124. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10. 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
125. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
126. See Gentala v. Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001): Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch.
Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000).
127. See Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 819: Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 384.
128. See Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 820: Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 394.
129. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
130. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 414 (1995). This is the same law at issue in Good News. See infra
notes 246-260 and accompanying text.
131. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
132. Id. at 386. New York precedent had upheld restrictions on the use of school property by
bible clubs under Section 414 because, "[rieligious purposes are not included in the enumerated
purposes for which a school may be used under section 414." Id. at 386-87 (quoting Trietley v.
Bd. of Educ. of Buffalo. 409 N.Y.S.2d 912. 915 (1978)).
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for which the school could be used, including social, civic, or recrea-
tional uses. 133 Consistent with Section 414 and New York precedent,
the rules expressly stated that "[tihe school premises shall not be used
by any group for religious purposes."' 34
Lamb's Chapel, a community church, sought to use the school to
show a film series discussing families, child rearing, and the impor-
tance of instilling Christian family values. 135 The school board twice
refused to let Lamb's Chapel use the school, indicating that the refusal
was based on the religious content of the films. 136
The Supreme Court, applying a limited public forum analysis, ac-
knowledged that the school district's refusal to let religious groups use
the school could only survive if it was "reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and .. viewpoint neutral."' 37 The Court
viewed the films not as religious subject matter, but as films about
child rearing from a religious perspective. 38 As child rearing was an
acceptable subject under the regulation, the Court held restricting ac-
cess based on the films' religious viewpoint was clearly a violation of
the First Amendment. 39
Citing Widmar v. Vincent,140 the Court dismissed the Establishment
Clause as a justification for the viewpoint discrimination in Lamb's
133. Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 387.
134. Id.
135. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388 n.3.
136. Id. at 388-89.
137. Id. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
138. Id. at 393-94.
139. Id.
[A]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address
a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum . . . or if he is not a member of
the class of speakers for whose special benefit the forum was created ... the govern-
ment violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to sup-
press the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includable subject.
Id. at 394 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
140. Widmar involved an open forum rather than a limited public forum. Widmar. 454 U.S. at
263. The forum, the university grounds and facilities, was open to any student groups with the
notable exception of groups wishing to use the forum for religious worship or teaching. Id. at
265. Because the Court found this limitation did not create a limited public forum. "the Court
applied the standard of review for content based exclusions-the need to show a compelling
state interest and a regulation narrowly drawn to achieve that end-and found the standard
unmet." See Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 213. The Court, applying the Lemon test,
further held that the Establishment Clause was not offended by a policy of equal access to all
student groups. Widmar. 454 U.S. at 271-77.
Justice Stevens's concurrence foreshadowed Rosenberger. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277-81 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens characterized the restriction as viewpoint discrimination,
because the limitation did not apply to philosophy. Id. at 281. In his dissent, Justice White
proposed that just because religious worship uses speech does not mean such speech is protected
by the Free Speech Clause. Id. (White. J.. dissenting). Justice White believed that to so hold
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Chapel because the Court found "no realistic danger that the commu-
nity would think that the District was endorsing religion ... and any
benefit to religion ... would have been no more than incidental." 141
The Court also dismissed the proposed justification of excluding relig-
ious purposes to prevent public unrest.142
b. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia.143
As in Lamb's Chapel, the Court in Rosenberger held that the re-
striction on religion from a limited public forum was a violation of
Free Speech rights and that the violation was not excused by the Es-
tablishment Clause.1 44 The University of Virginia 45 paid the printing
costs of numerous and diverse student publications through the Stu-
dent Activities Fund (SAF). 14 6  The SAF received its funds from
mandatory student fees and distributed those funds on behalf of stu-
dent groups for the purpose of providing diverse extracurricular activ-
ities related to education. 147
To be eligible to receive funds from the SAF, the SAF required
groups to first become Contracted Independent Organizations
(CIO).148 Religious organizations, defined as "organization [s] whose
purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality
or deity," were not eligible for CIO status. 149 Religious activities, de-
fined to include any activity that "promote[d] or manifest[ed] a partic-
would leave the Free Exercise Clause without meaning. Id. See also infra notes 469-473 and
accompanying text.
In Mergens, the Court extended Widmar to apply to high school students as well as university
students. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
141. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. The Court briefly addressed the Lemon test, finding
that allowing Lamb's Chapel to use the school was not an establishment of religion under
Lemon, because "[t]he challenged governmental action had a secular purpose, did not have the
principal ... effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and did not foster excessive entanglement
with religion." Id. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text and infra notes 369-370 and
accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test).
142. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-96 (stating that "[t]here is nothing in the record to sup-
port such a justification, which in any event would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the
presentation of a religious point of view about a subject the District otherwise opens to discus-
sion on District property"). See also supra note 70.
143. 515 U.S. 819 (2000).
144. Id. at 846
145. The University of Virginia is an instrumentality of Virginia and, therefore, is bound by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
146. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822.
147. Id. at 824.
148. Id. The University's guidelines recognized eleven categories of CIOs that were eligible
for reimbursement by the SAF. Id. "[S]tudent news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups" were included. Id. (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 826.
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ular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," were not
eligible for reimbursement by the SAF. 150 Political activities such as
electioneering and lobbying were also prohibited. 151 When a CIO was
eligible for reimbursement, payment was made directly to the outside
contractors-student groups did not receive any funds directly. 152
The University also executed a standard agreement with eligible stu-
dent groups that made clear the student groups were independent of
the University.15 3
Wide Awake Publications (WAP) was established as a CIO to pub-
lish a magazine with "sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian view-
points."15 4 After being given CIO status, WAP sought reimbursement
from SAF for printing costs. 155 SAF denied the request on the ground
that WAP promoted religion. 156
i. Rosenberger Majority
Analogizing Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that the SAF prohibi-
tion resulted in viewpoint discrimination. 157 As the Court character-
ized the SAF prohibition, it would prevent the discussion of much
philosophy.15 8 The Court dismissed the University's attempt to distin-
guish this case from Lamb's Chapel due to the use of funds rather
than facilities. 59
The Court held that the free speech violation was not justified by
the Establishment Clause. 60 Describing the neutrality of government
programs as a key factor in determining whether the Establishment
Clause has been violated, the Court found that allowing reimburse-
150. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
151. Id. at 825.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 824.
154. Id. at 826.
155. Id. at 827.
156. Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 827.
157. Id. at 830-31. Like Lamb's Chapel. the group was a qualified organization, except for its
religious purpose. Id. at 832: supra note 139. And as in Lamb's Chapel, the proffered rationale
for excluding the group's message was the group's religious views. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832:
supra note 139.
158. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836-37 (noting that the restriction as applied to WAP "has a vast
potential reach" and could include the works of Plato, Descartes, and Marx).
159. Id. at 832-35. Although the state has substantial discretion in determining how to allo-
cate scarce resources to accomplish its educational mission, see id. at 832-33 (citing Widmar, 454
U.S. at 276-77), even if the facilities in Lamb's Chapel had been scarce, the Court's decision
would have been no different. Id. at 835 (stating "the government cannot justify viewpoint dis-
crimination among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.").
160. Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 845-46.
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ment of WAP's costs would be neutral with respect to religion. 161 The
Court dismissed funding concerns by distinguishing the student activ-
ity fee from a tax.162 Finally, the Court noted that endorsement was
not a concern because the University had made clear that the student
newspapers did not represent the University's views. 163
ii. Rosenberger Dissent
Unlike Lamb's Chapel, which had no dissenting opinions, in Rosen-
berger, Justice David H. Souter was joined by Justices John Paul Ste-
vens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer in dissent. 164
Characterizing WAP's activities as preaching, 165 the dissent argued
that the Establishment Clause required the University to refuse to
support WAP's religious activities.1 66 The dissent further faulted the
majority for concluding that the student activity fee was not a tax.167
According to the dissent, through these mischaracterizations, the
Court attempted to "circumvent the clear bar to direct governmental
aid to religion." 168
The dissent pointed out that neutrality of government programs to-
ward religion is not enough to avoid a violation of the Establishment
Clause.169 "[Tihe Court must identify some further element in the
funding scheme that does demonstrate its permissibility. For one rea-
son or another, the Court's chosen element appears to be the fact that
... [the] funds are sent to the printer chosen by WAP, rather than to
WAP itself."' 70 According to the dissent, this did not create a true
"third party standing between the government and the ultimate relig-
161. Id. at 839-40 (finding that any benefit to religion would be incidental and there was no
suggestion that the University created the scheme to advance religion).
162. Id. at 840-41.
163. Id. at 841-42.
164. Id. at 863-99.
165. Id. at 865-68. Justice Souter described the first issue:
[T]he editor-in-chief announces Wide Awake's mission in a letter to the readership
signed. "Love in Christ": it is "to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, accord-
ing to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means." The masthead of every issue bears St. Paul's
exhortation, that "[t]he hour has come for you to awake from your slumber, because
our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed." Romans 13:11. Each issue of
Wide Awake contained in the record makes good on the editor's promise and echoes
the Apostle's call to accept salvation ....
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 866-67 (select citations omitted).
166. Id. at 864.
167. Id. at 873-76.
168. Id. at 864.
169. Id. at 877-86.
170. Id. at 866.
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ious beneficiary.' '171 As the Court acknowledged, "if the State pays
the church's bills it is subsidizing it. ' ' 172 Noting that the "common fac-
tual thread running through Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel is
that government institutions "created a limited public forum ... but
sought to exclude speakers with religious messages," the dissent dis-
tinguished Rosenberger saying, "[t]here is no traditional street corner
printing provided by the government on equal terms to all comers.' 73
The dissent also disagreed that the SAF regulation resulted in view-
point discrimination. 174 The SAF regulation applied not only to
Christian advocacy, but also to any religion, as well as agnostics and
atheists. 75 Pointing out that the University may fund a private publi-
cation about racism without skewing the debate about religion, the
dissent wondered where the Court's momentum in ignoring the differ-
ence between viewpoint and content discrimination would lead. 176
2. Split in Appellate Courts Before Good News
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Good News to resolve a
conflict among the circuits on the question of whether speech can be
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious na-
ture of the speech.1 77 Good News/Good Sports and Church on the
Rock fall on what would ultimately be the winning side of the conflict,
whereas Good News was not good news for Bronx Household, Camp-
bell, and Gentala, which have been called into question by the Su-
preme Court's decision. 178
a. The Winners After Good News
Good News/Good Sports and Church on the Rock were both left
intact by Good News. Interestingly, they were both decided before
the Court's decision in Rosenberger and thus had less direction from
the Court than two of the cases that Good News called into question.
171. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 866.
172. Id. at 887 n.10.
173. Id. at 888-89.
174. Id. at 894-95.
175. Id. at 895-96.
176. Id. at 898-99 (stating that "the Court's reasoning requires a university that funds private
publications about any primarily nonreligious topic also to fund publications primarily espousing
adherence to or rejection of religion.").
177. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099.
178. Id.; Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001): Campbell v. St. Tammany
Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000); Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No.
10. 127 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 1997): Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th
Cir. 1996): Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of City of Ladue. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994).
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i. Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of Ladue179
The Ladue School District's 1986 Use Policy allowed the local Good
News Club to use school facilities immediately after the school day.'8 0
Because parents complained about the religious content of the Good
News Clubs meetings, the school district of Ladue changed its policy
(Amended Use Policy) to allow only scouts and athletic groups to use
its facilities between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. on school days, and also pro-
hibited scouts from engaging in any religious speech during those
hours. 18  Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that both the club and scout meetings' subject matter
was morals, the Eighth Circuit held that the Amended Use Policy re-
sulted in viewpoint discrimination.1 82
The court further held that the viewpoint discrimination was not
justified by the compelling governmental interest of avoiding an Es-
tablishment Clause violation. 183 The School District argued that the
new policy constitutionally excluded religious uses if the old policy
violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious uses.'8 4 Ac-
cepting this as true, the court applied the Lemon test to the old pol-
icy. 185 The court determined that under Lemon there was no
government establishment of religion. 186
179. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
180. Id. at 1502-03.
The Club is a community- based, non-affiliated group that seeks to foster the moral
development of junior high school students from the perspective of Christian religious
values. Club advertisements state that the Club is not sponsored by the School District.
Parent volunteers run the Club meetings. The Club is open to junior high school stu-
dents regardless of their race, creed, denomination, or sex. The Club does require.
however, parental consent before a student may attend a meeting. Club activities in-
clude skits, singing (including Christian songs), role playing. Bible reading, prayer. and
speeches by community role models. The Club is religious, but non- denominational).
Id.
181. Id. at 1503. The policy stated that:
Permission for use of school facilities after instructional time ends on school days will
be granted to Community Groups: (1) for use of District's athletic facilities, provided
that the use is limited exclusively to athletic activities: and (2) for meetings of Scouts
(Girl. Boy. Cub, Tiger Cub, and Brownies), provided that such meetings shall be lim-
ited exclusively to the scout program and shall not include any speech or activity in-
volving religion or religious beliefs.
Id. The Scouts were exempted due to the School District's "long-standing tradition of coopera-
tion with scout programs." Id.
182. Good News/Good Sports Club. 28 F.3d at 1503.
183. Id. at 1510.
184. Id. at 1508.
185. Id. Although neither party had cited or applied the Lemon test, the court did not feel it
necessary to remand on this issue. Id. at 1508 n.14.
186. Id. at 1510. In determining that the effect of the policy did not advance religion, the
court followed the Seventh Circuit in Hedges v. Wauconda, 9 F.3d 1295. 1298-1300 (7th Cir.
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In dissent, Judge Bright asserted that the majority "ignor[ed] [dis-
trict court] Judge Filippine's careful and detailed findings of fact, mis-
constru[ed] the factual record made in this case and thereafter
attempt[ed] to apply the precedent of Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches School District to reach its conclusion."' 87  Judge Bright
found that preventing strife may be a reasonable concern.188 He fur-
ther found that the club and scouts were not so similar as to create
viewpoint discrimination by disallowing the club when scouts were al-
lowed.189 Finally, Bright attacked the majority's "somewhat theoreti-
cal view that, to avoid unconstitutional endorsement, schools must
simply state to their students that the school does not endorse all that
it permits." 190
1993), which extended Mergens by concluding junior high school students are also mature
enough to distinguish government speech and private speech. See supra note 140 and infra notes
275 and 474 (discussing Mergens).
187. Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1511 (citations omitted). The Club initially
met in parents' homes, then met for three years at the junior high school under the name Good
News. Id. at 1512. "The term 'Bible' first appeared on the Club's permit application for the
1991- 92 school year, thus clearly denoting the organization as a religious club." Id. Soon after,
"two parents complained of alleged recruitment of their children by the Club." Id. The
Amended Use Policy resulted. Id. Judge Bright noted that while classes end at 3 p.m., the
Board considered the end of the school day 6 p.m. when all school-sponsored activities end. Id.
After this time and on non-school days, the facilities are open to all community groups. Good
News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1512.
188. Id. at 1516.
While the Board had not received a request for access from any "hate" group, it con-
cluded reasonably that permitting the Club to use the Junior High School immediately
after the school day would open the door to all parent-sponsored religious groups for
children, including those whose speech most people would consider morally bankrupt
.... Hate speech is frequently cloaked in the garb of religion;
Id.
189. Id. at 1517-19. Judge Bright asserted "[t]hat both the Club and the Scouts may be con-
cerned with moral development does not make their activities necessarily similar." Id. at 1517.
In support of this assertion, Judge Bright referred to the evidence from the trial, stating that:
Scouts are primarily a secular organization engaging in secular activities. The purpose
of Scout meetings is for the young persons involved to have fun, to support the ideals of
Scouting, education, and reinforcement of moral values .... The Club, by contrast, was
initiated to teach the young members Christian values. Each parent who testified at
trial testified to the importance of the religious aspect of the Club and that a purpose of
the Club was to pass along Christian faith and morality to the student members of the
Club. A typical Club meeting consists of an opening prayer, snack, activity. Bible les-
son, and closing prayer. Plaintiff Chris Hirt testified in his deposition that he liked the
Club because it gave him an opportunity to relate to Christian friends and that it was
important to keep the Club going so that others might become Christian.
Id. at 1517-18 (emphasis in original).
190. Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1519 n.7, The majority stated that "[i]f pupils
do not comprehend so simple a lesson, then one wonders whether the ... schools can teach
anything at all." Id. (quoting Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1300). Judge Bright asserted that:
[The majority's] statement neglects two important facts: first, with many of our public
schools struggling to teach basic literacy and math skills, it is hard to imagine schools
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ii. Church on the Rock v. Albuquerque'9 1
In Church on the Rock, senior centers owned by the city permitted
nonmember groups 192 to use the centers for activities if the subject
matter was "of interest to senior citizens."'1 93 However, in accordance
with the Older American Act, 194 the city policy prohibited the use of
senior centers "for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious wor-
ship."'1 95 A local pastor, over the age of fifty-five, requested permis-
sion to use one of the senior centers to show a film entitled and
recounting the life of Jesus.1 96 Just before the end of the film, a narra-
tor "invite[d] viewers to adopt the Christian religion and to join him in
a short prayer."' 197 The pastor also requested permission to pass out
large print New Testaments at the end of the film. 198 The city denied
permission on the ground that the senior centers may not be used for
religious worship. 199
devoting much time to explicating the psychology of governmental endorsement: sec-
ond, the 'lesson' to be taught is far from simple. as reflected in our current jurispru-
dence of fine, sometimes imperceptible, Establishment Clause distinctions.
Id. at 1519 n.7.
191. 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996).
192. Id. at 1276. The only membership requirement was being either at least fifty-five years
old, or married to a member. Id.
193. Id. at 1277.
The range of subjects that qualify as being 'of interest to senior citizens' is quite broad.
The Senior Centers' activities catalogs list many of the programs that meet this require-
ment .... The catalogs also include a number of classes and presentations in which
religion or religious matters are the primary focus: Bible as Literature, Myths and Sto-
ries About the Millennium, Theosophy, and A Passover Commemoration (an
oratorio).
Id. at 1277.
194. Id.
The Older Americans Act provides federal funding to the states for multipurpose se-
nior centers, but requires, as a condition for receiving such funding, that the "facility
will not be used and is not intended to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for
religious worship." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv). In keeping with this directive,
Senior Center personnel screen programs for sectarian instruction or religious worship
before allowing them at the Senior Centers. Senior Center employees also monitor
presentations for religious content by sitting in on classes and entertaining objections
from Senior Center members who call attention to expression falling into one of these
forbidden categories. When Senior Center employees determine that presentations are
too religious in nature, they intervene to stop the presentations. There are no official
criteria or written standards to assist them in deciding whether or not expression consti-
tutes "sectarian instruction" or "religious worship."
Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1277.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
2002] IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
that the city had created a limited public forum in that it had limited
those who could enjoy the forum through the membership require-
ment and had also limited the subject matter through the requirement
that it must be "of interest to senior citizens. '200 However, the court
noted that the subject matter that could be presented in the forum was
extremely broad. 201 Citing Lamb's Chapel, the Tenth Circuit held that
the city policy of excluding use "for sectarian instruction or as a place
for religious worship," constituted viewpoint discrimination. 20 2
The city asserted that the prohibition was necessary to avoid violat-
ing the Establishment Clause.20 3 Relying on neutrality, the court
ruled that the restriction was unconstitutional, stating that "[w]here
the state does not sponsor the religious expression, the expression is
made on government property that has been opened to the public for
speech purposes, and permission is obtained through the same appli-
200. Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1278.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1279. The majority explained its holding of viewpoint discrimination:
The film Jesus dealt with subject matter similar to that, which would be included in a
class on the Bible as literature. The film ran afoul of City policy, however, by advocat-
ing the adoption of the Christian faith. In contrast, a film about Jesus' life that ended
on a skeptical note and urged agnosticism or atheism would not have contravened the
City's policy. Because "[t]he prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter"
triggered the decision to bar the private expression, the City's policy is properly ana-
lyzed as a viewpoint-based restriction on speech. Moreover, even if the City had not
previously opened the Senior Centers to presentations on religious subjects, its policy
would still amount to viewpoint discrimination. Any prohibition of sectarian instruc-
tion where other instruction is permitted is inherently non-neutral with respect to view-
point. Instruction becomes "sectarian" when it manifests a preference for a set of
religious beliefs. Because there is no nonreligious sectarian instruction (and indeed the
concept is a contradiction in terms), a restriction prohibiting sectarian instruction in-
trinsically favors secularism at the expense of religion. Therefore, we conclude that the
City's policy constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 1280. The City also asserted:
[l]ts policy [was] necessary to remain in compliance with the Older Americans Act. To
that end, the policy mirrors the language of the Older Americans Act, which requires as
a condition for receiving federal funding assurances that a "facility will not be used and
is not intended to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship."
42 U.S.C. §3027(a)(14)(A)(iv). The Tenth Circuit responded that: the fact that the
City's policy is designed to conform with federal statutory requirements, however, does
not shelter it from constitutional scrutiny. A city or state's desire for federal funds is
not a compelling government interest. Thus, compliance with the Older Americans Act
does not justify this viewpoint-based restriction on expression. In the context
presented here, no government entity may permissibly control the viewpoint being
expressed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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cation process and on the same terms as secular groups, there is no
violation of the Establishment Clause. '20 4
b. Decisions Called into Question by Good News
The Supreme Court's decision in Good News called Bronx House-
hold, Campbell, and Gentala into question. Bronx Household and
Campbell both held that the exclusion of religion from limited public
forums amounted only to content discrimination and, as such, was
permissible as a reasonable restriction to preserve the purpose of the
forums.20 5 The Gentala court, on the other hand, found viewpoint dis-
crimination in the exclusion of the religious speech from the limited
public forum, but held that such exclusion was justified by the city's
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. 20 6
i. Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School District
No. 10207
In Bronx Household, the community school district's policy prohib-
ited the use of school facilities after the school day for "religious ser-
vices or instruction." The policy, however, explicitly permitted the use
of those facilities "for the purposes of discussing religious material or
material which contains a religious viewpoint. ' 20 8 In accordance with
the policy, the district denied Bronx Household's request to use the
school's gymnasium for weekly religious services.20 9
204. Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1280 (citing Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 754 (1995)).
205. Campbell, 206 F.3d at 487: Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 215.
206. Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001).
207. 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
208. Id. at 212-13. The Second Circuit, overruled by the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel,
was careful to distinguish Lamb's Chapel, stating:
[P]resumably, the showing of the film series described in Lamb's Chapel is permissible
under the rules governing District # 10. What is not permitted under SOP 5.9 is the use
of school premises for worship or religious instruction, and it is important to note that
the parties have agreed that District # 10 never has rented school property for that
purpose. This limitation is characteristic of a limited forum, for it represents the exer-
cise of the power to restrict a public forum to certain speakers and to certain subjects.
It would seem to go without saying that certain types of speech may be prohibited in
public schools, even after school hours. M.S. 206B simply is not a place that has been
devoted to general, unrestricted public assembly by long tradition or by policy or prac-
tice. Cf Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist.. 907 F.2d 1366, 1378-79, 1382 (3d Cir. 1990)
(permitting indiscriminate access to high school facility created open forum so as to
allow use of facility after school hours for religious speech and worship). It is not an
open public forum as that term has been defined by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 213.
209. Id. at 211. The church admitted that its proposed use is specifically prohibited by the
policy. Id. at 215. The church's pastor stated that "the Church proposed to conduct 'church
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the policy preserved the distinction between permissible subject
matter discrimination and impermissible viewpoint discrimination
made in Lamb's Chapel and reiterated in Rosenberger "by prohibiting
religious worship and religious instruction by outside groups, a prohi-
bition that state authorities consider necessary to preserve the pur-
poses of the limited public school forum, and by specifically
permitting religious viewpoint speech in relation to matters for which
the public school forum is open." 210
The Bronx Household court specifically addressed both reasonable-
ness and viewpoint neutrality, having been "faulted in Lamb's Chapel
for 'utter[ing] not a word in support of [our] reasonableness hold-
ing.'" 2 11 The court found the regulation reasonable and further found
the regulation "specifically permits any and all speech from a religious
viewpoint. '212
worship services,' which he described as 'includ[ing] hymn singing, communion, Bible reading,
Bible preaching and teaching.' Id.
210. Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 213. The Bronx Household Court attempted to
distinguish Church on the Rock because there, the senior center had allowed other religious
presentations, although it attempted to prevent religious instruction or worship. See supra notes
191-204 and accompanying text for a summary of Church on the Rock. Here, the forum had
never allowed any religious presentations. Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 211. The
Bronx Household Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit that the senior center would have to
allow religious instruction even if other religious subjects had not been presented at the center.
Id. at 214. After the decision in Good News, it is apparent that the Supreme Court agreed with
the Tenth Circuit. See infra notes 246-320 and 380-422 and accompanying text.
211. Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 214 (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 n.6).
With respect to reasonableness, the Second Circuit laundry listed why it found the restriction
reasonable:
We think that it is reasonable in this case for a state and a school district to adopt
legislation and regulations denying a church permission to use school premises for reg-
ular religious worship. We think that it is reasonable for state legislators and school
authorities to avoid the identification of a middle school with a particular church. We
think that it is reasonable for these authorities to consider the effect upon the minds of
middle school children of designating their school as a church. And we think that it is a
proper state function to decide the extent to which church and school should be sepa-
rated in the context of the use of school premises for regular church services. Educa-
tion, after all, is a particularly important state function, and the use of school premises
is properly a matter of particular state concern. Finally. it is certainly not unreasonable
to assume that church services can be undertaken in some place of public assembly
other than a public middle school in New York City.
Id.
212. Id. at 214-15.
The purposes for which the schools in District # 10 have been opened to outside organi-
zations encompass a wide variety of civic and social uses, and any speech conducted in
connection with those uses may be bottomed on a religious viewpoint ... [T~he ques-
tion is whether a distinction can be drawn between [worship and religious instruction]
and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint that District # 10 has elected to
allow in the limited forum of a public middle school. We think it can. What SOP 5.9 is
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The Bronx Household court further indicated that the board of edu-
cation did not need to justify its denial with the Establishment Clause
because the limitation was "both reasonable in light of the permitted
after-school uses of the forum and viewpoint neutral as well. '213
The church also alleged that the policy violated the Free Exercise
Clause by excluding religious services and instruction from its limited
public forum.21 4 The court's response was that the members of the
church were "free to practice their religion, albeit in a [separate] loca-
tion . . . . 'The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the
right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.'
That right has not been taken from members of the church. 21 5
Judge Cabranes dissented with respect to the exclusion of religious
instruction, believing it "discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by
allowing private groups to conduct after-school instruction on a wide
array of topics only from a secular perspective" and therefore, violates
the Free Speech Clause. 216 He further noted that such discrimination
was not required by the Establishment Clause. 217 Judge Cabranes
agreed, however, with the majority that the exclusion of religious ser-
intended to do seems clear: it is intended to prohibit outside groups from using school
premises after school for "religious services or religious instruction" while permitting
such groups to use school premises for "discussing religious material or material which
contains a religious viewpoint or for distributing such material." In adopting this lan-
guage, it appears that the New York City Board of Education has attempted meticu-
lously to comply with the teaching of Lamb's Chapel.
Id. (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 216. See infra notes 374-422 and accompanying text.
214. Bronx Household of Faith. 127 F.3d at 216.
215. Id. at 216 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)).
216. Id. at 217.
Where secular viewpoints on a subject are concerned, the District's policy allows pri-
vate groups not only to discuss the subject, but to instruct others from their secular
perspective without hindrance by public authorities. Where religious viewpoints on the
same subject are detected, private groups may "discuss" but they may not "instruct."
Far from properly treading the delicate line between discrimination based on subject
matter or content and discrimination based on viewpoint, as the majority contends, the
District's policy banning religious instruction, while at the same time allowing instruc-
tion on any subject of learning from a secular viewpoint, is an impermissible form of
viewpoint discrimination.
Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
217. Id.
As in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger. moreover, the District's preference for secular
instruction over religious instruction cannot be justified by an Establishment Clause
defense. The ban on instruction from a religious perspective, far from being required
by the Establishment Clause, if anything offends "the very neutrality the Establishment
Clause requires." There is nothing in the record to suggest that by allowing religious
instruction to take place after school hours on an equal basis with other forms of in-
struction the District would or could "willfully foster[ ] or encourage[ ] any mistaken
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vices from the limited public forum was reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. 2 18
ii. Campbell v. St. Tammany's School Board219
In Campbell, the school district policy allowed outside groups to use
school facilities after school hours for "civic, recreational and en-
tertainment purposes" if such activities were open to the public and
pertained to the "welfare of the public. '220 The policy permitted the
use of school facilities for "discussions of religious material or mate-
rial containing a religious viewpoint," but specifically excluded uses
involving "religious services or religious instruction. "221
Sally Campbell and the Louisiana Christian Coalition requested,
and were denied, use of school facilities for a "prayer meeting. '222
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first deter-
mined whether the policy had created a limited public forum.223
While noting that the policy contained very few restrictions, the court
nonetheless determined that the policy had not created an open fo-
rum.2 24 Finding that the school district had created a limited public
impression" that the organizations conducting after-school religious instruction actually
speak for the District.
Id. at 220-21 (citations omitted).
218. Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 217.
Unlike religious "instruction," there is no real secular analogue to religious "services,"
such that a ban on religious services might pose a substantial threat of viewpoint dis-
crimination between religion and secularism .... Because "services" are by definition
religious in nature, it does not appear that they could ordinarily be understood to serve
as a vehicle for both religious and secular viewpoints.
Id. at 221. However, Judge Cabrenes questioned "government's ability to draw distinctions be-
tween religious worship" and speech from a religious viewpoint. Id.
219. 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000). Campbell has been remanded in light of Good News.
Campbell relied heavily on Bronx Household, which was also called into question by Good
News. See supra notes 207-218 and accompanying text for a summary of Bronx Household.
220. Campbell, 206 F.3d at 484.
221. Id. The policy also specifically excluded partisan political activity and for-profit fund-
raising. Id. at 484-85.
222. Id. at 484. In her application, Campbell described the purpose of the prayer meeting: "to
worship the Lord in prayer and music ... to discuss family and political issues, pray about those
issues, and seek to engage in religious and Biblical instruction with regard to those issues." Id.
223. Id. at 486.
224. Campbell, 206 F.3d at 486-87. The court specifically compared the number of uses pro-
hibited by this policy with the number of uses prohibited by the policy in Bronx Household,
finding that:
[The District's policy restricts more types of uses than the use policy held not to have
created a public forum in Bronx Household. The policy's restrictions indicate that the
school's purposes in allowing some public use have not reached the point at which any
use-save targeted religious activities-is allowed. We are thus persuaded that the restric-
tions are minimally sufficient to maintain the school buildings' status as a non-public
forum.
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forum, the court analyzed whether the policy was reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. 225 Distinguishing Lamb's Chapel, and relying
heavily on Bronx Household, the Fifth Circuit upheld the restriction
on religious services as viewpoint neutral. 226 Although the court rec-
ognized the reasonableness requirement, the court did not address
whether the restriction was reasonably related to the purpose of the
forum.
2 2 7
Id. at 486-87.
225. Id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court, which held that the policy was
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 484.
The district court concluded that there was no intelligible way of determining when
speech involving religious material or with a religious viewpoint, permitted by the pol-
icy, crossed over into religious instruction, forbidden by the policy. The court also
noted that there was no definition of "religious worship" provided in the policy.
Id. The Fifth Circuit responded that:
[A]s applied to Campbell's request, which includes verbatim some of the prohibited
terms, the policy is not even arguably vague. The group planned to "worship the Lord
in prayer and music" and "engage in religious and Biblical instruction." There can be
no doubt that these activities are included within the policy's disallowed uses .... As a
facial challenge, we fail to see how the terms "religious instruction" and "religious wor-
ship" would provoke confusion amounting to unconstitutional vagueness. There is a
clear core meaning. The terms have a common meaning such that people can use them
without particular difficulty. While the language might be subject to ambiguity at the
margins-for example, the line between instruction and discussion may blur at the
edges-that effect is no more than the limits of language stretched by the active imagi-
nation of hypothesized application. To the point, we are not persuaded of uncertainty
sufficiently chilling of speech to find the policy to be substantially overbroad.
Id. at 485.
226. Campbell, 206 F.3d at 487.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., the exclusion of a meeting
on a subject permitted by a school district was unconstitutional because it was disal-
lowed only because of the speaker's religious viewpoint. This does not mean that any
ban on religious activities amounts to viewpoint discrimination. Religion may be either
a perspective on a topic such as marriage or may be a substantive activity in itself. In
the latter case, the government's exclusion of the activity is discrimination based on
content, not viewpoint.
The Bronx Household court held that religious services and religious instruction are
activities that may be excluded as content-based discrimination. We agree with this
approach, finding that religious services and instruction are not simply approaches to a
topic, but activities whose primary purpose is to teach and experience the subject of
religion. These are activities distinct from a topical discussion, a social gathering, or a
political meeting. The District has excluded such religious activities but does not forbid
speakers on general topics with a religious perspective-a distinction that viewpoint
neutrality permits.
Id. (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit further noted that just because the District had allowed
the use of school premises for a church banquet and gospel choir did not mean that the District
had opened the facility for religious uses, stating that "[w]hile these groups may have had relig-
ious affiliations, the events involved no religious instruction and were not prayer meetings." Id.
227. Id.
2002] IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS? 155
iii. Gentala v. Tucson 22
8
The City of Tucson allowed all groups to use the city bandshell. 229
Additionally, groups could apply to use civic events funds to pay for
the use of city equipment during an event at the bandshell. 230 The
fund was derived from general tax revenue.231 To use the fund, the
event had to be nonprofit and celebrate historical, cultural, or ethnic
heritage. 232 The applicant was required to show, among other criteria,
whether the event would generate broad community appeal and par-
ticipation. 233 The city required organizations that received support to
advertise the support from the city and, during the event, credit the
city for helping to sponsor the event.234 The city denied requests for
the events directly supporting religious organizations, although the
events were not necessarily religious in character. 235 However, the
city supported events sponsored by religious-affiliated organizations
when the events did not benefit the groups themselves, as well as
events with religious themes sponsored by secular organizations. 236
In the spring of 1997, the Prayer Committee received a permit to
use the city bandshell for a National Day of Prayer led by local pas-
tors.237 During the National Day of Prayer, contributions were to be
collected to pay for that and future events. 238 The organizers, includ-
228. 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001). Gentala has been remanded in light of Good News.
229. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1068.
230. Id. When support was approved by the city, no payment was provided directly to spon-
sors. Id. at 1069. Transfers were made within city departments. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1068-69. Specifically, the fund was established to support events that:
celebrate and commemorate the historical, cultural and ethnic heritage of the City and
the nation, or increase the community's knowledge and understanding of critical issues
[.. k] generate broad community appeal and participation[;] instill civic pride in the
City, state, or nation[:] contribute to tourism[:] or are identified as unique community
events.
Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1068.
233. Id. at 1069.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1070.
The Fund declined to support several fundraisers for Christian schools, including the
San Xavier Mission School's pageant celebrating "the heritage of the Old Pueblo." the
Santa Cruz Church and school's "Fiesta de Familia," the St. John the Evangelist
School's annual Fiesta, and the St. Peter & Paul School's "Fun Days."
Id. at 1070 n.6. Cf Campbell. 206 F.3d 482 (holding that application of regulation in question
allowed a church banquet fund-raiser to use the forum). See supra note 226.
236. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1070. "For example, the City provided Fund support to a fishing
clinic for disabled children sponsored by the Aid Association for Lutherans." Id. at n.7
237. Id. at 1067. In its application, the Prayer Committee described the National Day of
Prayer as "a time of prayer and worship." Id. Although the event was open to the public, the
Prayer Committee required its members to pledge to Christian beliefs. Id.
238. Id.
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ing the Gentalas, applied for civic events funds to pay for the use of
city equipment and related services, indicating in the application that
the event was in the historical category.239 The Civic Events Subcom-
mittee denied the request on the grounds that the event was "in direct
support of religious organization. '240
Alleging that the exclusion from the fund of events in direct support
of religious organizations violated the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment, the Gentalas filed suit.241 Citing Ro-
senberger, the district court denied the Gentalas' motions for an in-
junction, recognizing that although the First Amendment's speech
protection extends to religious speech, the Establishment Clause in
this case justified the exclusion of religious speech. 242
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's review
began with the proposition that if the city's Establishment Clause jus-
tification was valid, then the exclusion of religious speech in a forum
otherwise dedicated to community activity was also valid.243  The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the
denial of funds, here the equivalent to the denial of the use of a lim-
ited public forum, was justified by Establishment Clause considera-
tions, citing significant factual differences from Rosenberger.244 The
239. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1070.
240. Id.
241. Id. The Gentalas first sought review by the City Council, which concluded the denial was
proper because it "would violate the separation of church and state for the City to sponsor any
event directly supporting a religious group." Id.
242. Id. at 1071.
243. Id. at 1074.
244. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1074-80. With respect to funding concerns, here the fund is derived
from general tax revenue, whereas in Rosenberger the fund was derived from student fees. See
supra text accompanying note 146. In this case, the prohibition applied only to events directly
supporting religious organizations, whereas in Rosenberger the prohibition was applied to deny
funding for a student newspaper with religious viewpoint. See supra notes 157-163 and accompa-
nying text. The funds here would be used to sponsor a participatory religious service, so funding
would be "tantamount to the State pay[ing] a church's bills." Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1078 (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court had previously suggested that government discretion "greatly ex-
acerbates the significance of tax-based derivation of the funding." Id. (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S.
at 809-14). The city's funding was also explicitly discretionary and the purpose was to increase
tourism and promote the city. See supra note 232. In Rosenberger, the purpose of the funds was
to promote diversity of ideas. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 821. Finally, the Prayer Committee
planned to use this meeting to collect funds to sponsor future prayer meetings. whereas in Ro-
senberger, no fund raising was involved so the effect of the University sponsored funds were
exhausted on a per publication basis. Compare Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 830-31, with Gentala,
244 F.3d at 1067. The court recognized that providing equipment and services for this event was
different than providing basic, essential services to all citizens, such as police and fire. Gentala,
244 F.3d at 1082.
With respect to city endorsement, the subsidy in Gentala would include "on-site, observable
presence of city employees" and equipment. Id. at 1079. The court held that the "subjective
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court found in this case public funding and government endorsement
considerations overwhelmed neutrality considerations and further-
more, the denial of such funds was not a violation of Free Speech or
Free Exercise Clauses as the prayer committee meeting took place as
planned.245
III. SUBJECT OPINION: GOOD NEWS CLUB V. MILFORD
CENTRAL SCHOOL
2 4 6
In Good News, the Supreme Court purported to resolve a circuit
split regarding whether the religious nature of the speech can justify
the exclusion of such speech from a limited public forum.247 The
Court claimed to address two issues. 248 The first issue was whether by
excluding the Good News Club from using school facilities, Milford
Central School violated the club's free speech rights.249 And second,
if Milford did violate the First Amendment, did Milford's concern that
granting the club access would violate the Establishment Clause jus-
tify the violation? 250 Despite finding that the local school board had
not yet raised a valid Establishment Clause concern, the Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of the Good News Club from the limited
public forum amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimi-
nation. 251
funding criteria" contributed to "an informed observer's impression" that "City affirmatively
endorse[d]" the activity. Id. The city's policy and application form made clear that the city
intended to endorse some events, and the event organizer must call attention to city's support in
advertising and during the event itself, hi. at 1068-69. The court noted that even requiring the
"City to hide its true relationship to the event would not alter that relationship. but, instead,
would only mislead the public," and furthermore, the court noted that it does not have authority
to restructure the city's program. Id. at 1080.
245. Id. at 1078, 1082. There was no showing that Free Exercise has been burdened by the
operation of the Civic Event program. Gentala. 244 F.3d at 1082. The event took place in the
city bandshell and was well attended. Id.
246. 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
247. Id. at 2099.
248. Id. at 2097.
249. Id.
250. Id. See infra notes 423-454 and accompanying text.
251. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2107.
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A. Facts
Under New York law,252 school districts may adopt regulations to
252. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 414 (2002).
Use of schoolhouse and grounds.
1. Schoolhouses and the grounds connected therewith and all property belonging to the
district shall be in the custody and under the control and supervision of the trustees or
board of education of the district. The trustees or board of education may adopt rea-
sonable regulations for the use of such schoolhouses, grounds or other property, all
portions thereof, when not in use for school purposes or when the school is in use for
school purposes if in the opinion of the trustees or board of education use will not be
disruptive of normal school operations, for such other public purposes as are herein
provided; except, however, in the city of New York each community school board shall
be authorized to prohibit any use of schoolhouses and school grounds within its district
which would otherwise be permitted under the provisions of this section . . . . The
trustees or board of education of each district may, subject to regulations adopted as
above provided, permit the use of the schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the grounds
and other property of the district, when not in use for school purposes or when the
school is in use for school purposes if in the opinion of the trustees or board of educa-
tion use will not be disruptive of normal school operations, for any of the following
purposes:
(a) For the purpose of instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts ....
(c) For holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other
uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and
uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general public.
(d) For meetings, entertainments and occasions where admission fees are charged,
when the proceeds thereof are to be expended for an educational or charitable pur-
pose: but such use shall not be permitted if such meetings, entertainments and occa-
sions are under the exclusive control, and the said proceeds are to be applied for the
benefit of a society, association or organization of a religious sect or denomination, or
of a fraternal, secret or exclusive society or organization other than organizations of
veterans of the military, naval and marine service of the United States and organiza-
tions of volunteer firefighters or volunteer ambulance workers ....
(f) For civic forums and community centers. Upon the petition of at least twenty-five
citizens residing within the district or city, the trustees or board of education in each
school district or city shall organize and conduct community centers for civic purposes,
and civic forums in the several school districts and cities, to promote and advance prin-
ciples of Americanism among the residents of the state. The trustees or board of edu-
cation in each school district or city, when organizing such community centers or civic
forums, shall provide funds for the maintenance and support of such community cen-
ters and civic forums, and shall prescribe regulations for their conduct and supervision,
provided that nothing herein contained shall prohibit the trustees of such school district
or the board of education to prescribe and adopt rules and regulations to make such
community centers or civic forums self-supporting as far as practicable. Such commu-
nity centers and civic forums shall be at all times under the control of the trustees or
board of education in each school district or city, and shall be non-exclusive and open
to the general public.
(g) For classes of instruction for mentally retarded minors operated by a private organi-
zation approved by the commissioner of education.
(h) For recreation, physical training and athletics, including competitive athletic con-
tests of children attending a private, nonprofit school ....
(j) For graduation exercises held by not-for-profit elementary and secondary schools,
provided that no religious service is performed.
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allow for the use of school facilities for non-school functions.2 53 Pur-
suant to Section 414, the District Board of Education for Milford Cen-
tral School enacted a community use policy, which included many of
Section 414's enumerated uses, including item (a) "instruction in any
branch of education, learning or the arts" and item (c) "social, civic
and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses
pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses
shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public. '254
The community use policy further provided that "[s]chool premises
shall not be used by any individual or organization for religious pur-
poses. Those individuals and/or organizations wishing to use school
facilities and/or grounds under this policy shall indicate ... that any
intended use of school premises is in accordance with this policy. '255
The Fourniers, sponsors of the local Good News Club,256 submitted
an application to use Milford Central School for the club's weekly af-
The board of education in the city of New York may delegate the authority to judge the
appropriateness for uses other than school purposes to community school boards.
2. The trustees or board of education shall determine the terms and conditions for such
use which may include rental at least in an amount sufficient to cover all resulting
expenses for the purposes of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (i) and () of subdivi-
sion one of this section. Any such use, pursuant to paragraphs (a), (c). (d) and (h) of
subdivision one of this section, shall not allow the exclusion of any district child solely
because said child is not attending a district school or not attending the district school
which is sponsoring such use or on which grounds the use is to occur.
Id.
253. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2097-98.
254. Id. at 2098. Milford's "Community Use of School Facilities Policy," adopted on August
26, 1992, is nearly identical to § 414. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d
147, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). Section 414 created a limited public forum by specifying certain uses.
See supra note 252. Religious worship was not among these uses. Id. Milford's policy, while
adopting many of the uses enumerated in § 414. is unlike § 414 in that it specifically excludes
religious purposes. Good News. 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
255. Good News, 202 F.3d at 504.
256. The club is a nationwide, private Christian organization for children ages six through
twelve. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 149. The club's "stated purpose [was] to instruct children
in family values and morals from a Christian perspective." Id. The club's purpose, as stated on
the application for use of school cafeteria, was "hearing a bible lesson and memorizing scrip-
ture." Id.
A typical Club meeting include[d] an opening prayer. singing of Christian songs, mem-
orization and recital of Biblical verses and scripture for which the children receive
prizes, a discussion based on a Bible reading, and a closing prayer. Indeed, plaintiffs[']
own description of the Club's activities [was] characteristic of a classroom-type setting
with formal instruction: The Club open[ed] its session with Ms. Fournier taking attend-
ance. As she call[ed] a child's name, if the child recite[d] a Bible verse the child re-
ceive[d] a treat. After attendance, the Club [sang] songs. Next Club members
engage[d] in games that involve[d], inter alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then
relate[d] a Bible story and explain[ed] how it applies to Club members' lives. The Club
close[d] with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier distribute[d] treats and the Bible verses for
memorization.
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ter school meetings.257 On the application, the Fourniers described
the activity of the club as "a fun time of singing songs, hearing a Bible
lesson and memorizing scripture. '' 258 Because the school superinten-
dent found out that the Fourniers' proposed use was equivalent to
religious worship and the community use policy specifically prohibited
the use of school premises for religious purposes, he denied the
Fourniers' request.25 9 The Fourniers filed suit.260
B. The District Court Opinion26 1
In March 1997, the Good News Club and the Fourniers filed an ac-
tion against Milford in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of New York alleging that Milford's denial of the Good
New Club's application violated its free speech rights under the First
Amendment. 262 The district court granted the club a preliminary in-
junction to permit the club's use of school facilities. 26 3 In August
1998, the district court vacated the preliminary injunction and granted
Id. at 154.
257. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2098.
258. Id.
259. Id. In response to a request for "materials to further clarify the nature of the instruction
and activities that would take place at a Club meeting," the Club submitted a description of the
Club's activities. Good News. 202 F.3d at 507: see also supra note 256.
[T]he Good News's counsel forwarded a set of materials used or distributed by the
Club. Among the materials submitted were a Good News invitation printed on an
index card, a parental permission slip, a sample puzzle, and a copy of the "Daily
Bread." This issue of the Daily Bread contained stories that refer to the second coming
of Christ, accepting the Lord Jesus as the Savior, and believing in the Resurrection and
in the descent of the Lord Jesus from Heaven. After a review of the materials. [the
superintendent] and counsel determined that "the kinds of activities proposed to be
engaged in by the Good News [a]re not a discussion of secular subjects such as child
rearing, development of character and development of morals from a religious perspec-
tive. but were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction itself.
Good News, 202 F.3d. at 507.
260. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098.
261. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
262. Id. at 150. The Good News and the Fourniers also alleged that Milford's denial of their
application violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq (1993). Id. Prior to the
district court's decision, the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150 n.4. With respect to the
Fourniers' equal protection claim, the district court held that the school board had made a per-
missible distinction between clubs in disallowing the Good News. Id. at 161. Although the
Equal Protection Clause requires that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." id. at 161 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)), the district court found that
the clubs' "purpose and subject matter are substantially dissimilar in nature." because Good
News' religious purpose "places the Club in a different genre than the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts.
and 4-H Club." Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 161. On appeal, Good News abandoned the
Equal Protection claim as well as the RFRA claim. Good News, 202 F.3d at 508 n.7.
263. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
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Milford's motion for summary judgment finding that the club's "sub-
ject matter is decidedly religious in nature and not merely a discussion
of secular matters from a religious perspective. '264
The district court held that Milford's policy was consistent with Sec-
tion 414 and citing Lamb's Chapel,265 the court stated that Milford's
policy "recognize[d] that it may properly exclude clubs with a religious
purpose provided such exclusion is reasonable and viewpoint neu-
tral." 266 Having found that Milford's exclusion of Good News was
viewpoint neutral, the district court did not consider whether
Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club from the school was nec-
essary to prevent an Establishment Clause violation. 267
C. The Appellate Court268
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.269 The club at-
tacked both the reasonableness of the restriction and the
determination that the restriction was viewpoint neutral. 270 With re-
spect to reasonableness, Milford's stated purpose for the restriction
was to "ensur[e] that students in its charge are not left with the im-
pression that [it] endorses religious instruction in its school, or that it
264. Id. at 154. Both plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment. Id. at 149.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if, given the evidence, a reasonable jury could
rule in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On
a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all available facts and reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Here the parties agreed that the community use policy created a limited public forum. Good
News. 21 F. Supp. 2d at 153. Therefore, the Good News meetings could have been validly ex-
cluded on the basis of content, but not on the basis of viewpoint. Because Good News did not
dispute that Milford may prohibit the use of school facilities for religious purposes. the only
question on summary judgment was whether Good News proposed use constituted religious
purposes or merely secular activities from a religious viewpoint. Id. at 158. Good News claimed
its purpose was moral development of youth from a religious viewpoint, and was therefore the
same type of activity as Scouts, but with a different viewpoint. Id. at 154. Finding that the
nature of Good News activities was religious, not secular, the court found that Milford had not
allowed its facilitates to be used for other religious purposes. Id. at 158-60. It therefore found
valid content discrimination in the limited public forum. Id. at 160.
265. Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 393.
266. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 161. The parties agreed that the community use policy
created a limited public forum. Id. at 153.
267. Id. at 160. See also Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95 (suggesting that preventing state
establishment of religion may justify a free speech violation).
268. 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000).
269. Id. at 511.
270. Id. at 509.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:125
advances the beliefs of a particular religion or group thereof. '271 The
club argued that the restriction was unreasonable because children
were unlikely to confuse use of the school with the school's, and
thereby the state's, endorsement of the club's activities. 272
The Second Circuit rejected this argument based on its precedent,
Bronx Household,273 in which the court held that "it is a proper state
function to decide the extent to which church and school should be
separated in the context of the use of school premises. '2 74 Because
the students of Milford Central School were "young and impressiona-
ble" and "[t]he activities of the [c]lub clearly and intentionally com-
municate[d] Christian beliefs by teaching and by prayer," the court
found Milford's desire to avoid communicating to "students of other
faiths that they were less welcome than students who adhere to the
[c]lub's teachings" was reasonable. 275
With respect to viewpoint neutrality, the Second Circuit agreed with
the district court that the Good News Club's activities were not
merely teaching morals from a religious perspective. 276 The Good
News Club relied on the Eighth Circuit's holding in Good News/Good
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 207-218 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second Circuit's opin-
ion in Bronx Household).
274. Good News, 202 F.3d at 509 (citing Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 214). In Bronx
Household, the court further stated that "it is reasonable for state legislators and school authori-
ties to avoid the identification of a middle school with a particular church." Bronx Household of
Faith, 127 F.3d at 214.
275. Good News, 202 F.3d at 509. Compare Good News, 202 F.3d at 509 (students aged six
through twelve) with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (college aged students) and Mergens, 496 U.S. at
231 (high school students).
276. Good News. 202 F.3d at 510.
The Club meetings offer children the opportunity to pray with adults, to recite biblical
verse, and to declare themselves "saved." The Club argues that these practices are
necessary because its viewpoint is that a relationship with God is necessary to make
moral values meaningful. Even accepting that this precept is a viewpoint on morality
and not a religious principle, it is clear from the conduct of the meetings that the Good
News goes far beyond merely stating its viewpoint. The Club is focused on teaching
children how to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ. Under even
the most restrictive and archaic definitions of religion, such subject matter is quintes-
sentially religious.
Id. The Second Circuit also agreed with the district court that Good News's attempt to analogize
itself with Scouts was unsuccessful, stating that:
[W]hile the Boy Scouts teach reverence and a duty to God generally, this teaching is
incidental to the main purpose of the organization, which is personal growth and devel-
opment of leadership skills. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the Boy Scouts require any particular means of demonstrating reverence and duty to
God. Similarly, the Girl Scouts vow to "try ... [t]o serve God and [their] country."
Id. at 511.
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Sports Club v. School District of Ladue.277 The Second Circuit dis-
missed the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that excluding the Good News/
Good Sports Club from school facilities amounted to viewpoint dis-
crimination because the Eighth Circuit "apparently took for granted
that the Good News/Good Sports Club's activities amounted only to
speaking on moral and character development. '278
Judge Jacobs dissented from the Second Circuit's holding, arguing
that with respect to morals and character, it is impossible to distin-
guish between religious viewpoint and religious subject matter.279 The
Fourniers argued that the subject matter of morality presented from a
Christian perspective necessarily encompassed religious activities, in-
cluding prayer.280 Therefore, they argued that requiring them to omit
such religious activities to gain access to the limited public forum pre-
cluded them from expressing their viewpoint, which amounted to a
violation of the First Amendment. 281 Indicating that the secular sub-
ject matter of morals and character did not change their nature when
the viewpoint was religious, Judge Jacobs criticized the majority for
concluding that because the "[c]lub's moral vision entails religious ac-
tivity," the subject matter was religious. 28 2 Because he believed it was
impossible to decide whether the club's activities had religious content
or viewpoint, Judge Jacobs concluded that the court should have
"err[ed] on the side of free speech. '283
277. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 179-191 and accompanying text.
278. Good News, 202 F.3d at 511.
279. Id. at 511-15. Jacobs pointed to the club's statement that the morals and values it teaches
are "senseless without Christ," stating:
[T]he distinction is especially slippery where the viewpoint in question is religious, in
part because the sectarian religious perspective will tend to look to the deity for an-
swers to moral questions. The idea that moral values take their shape and force from
God seems to me to be a viewpoint for the consideration of moral questions. True,
religious answers to questions about morals and character tend to be couched in overtly
religious terms and to implicate religious devotions, but that is because the sectarian
viewpoint is an expression of religious insight, confidence or faith-not because the
religious viewpoint is a change of subject .... Although the religious viewpoint thus
has the tendency to overwhelm the secularity of a subject matter, this transformative,
goal-directed tendency of religious viewpoints does not justify a preference for other
viewpoints.
Id. at 514.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Good News. 202 F.3d at 515.
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D. Supreme Court's Decision in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School 284
The Supreme Court held the Good News Club's free speech rights
were violated and that this violation could not be justified by the Es-
tablishment Clause because the Court found that the city failed to
raise a valid Establishment Clause claim. 28 5
Because the parties agreed that the forum was a limited public fo-
rum, the Court applied the rules developed in Rosenberger, Lamb's
Chapel, and Cornelius.286 The Court determined that the activity here
was indistinguishable from Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger because,
according to the Court, the club sought to address a subject, the teach-
ing of morals and character, which was otherwise permitted under the
rule, from a religious standpoint.287  The Court declared that the
club's speech was not "religious worship, divorced from any teaching
of moral values," but rather the teaching of moral values from a relig-
ious viewpoint. 2s8
284. 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
285. Id. at 2097, 2103.
286. Id. at 2100. Specifically, the Court stated the limited public forum analysis as follows:
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does
not allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified "in
reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics." The
State's power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be "rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.
Id. (citations omitted).
287. Id. at 2101. The Court indicated that the only difference between Lamb's Chapel and
Good News is that the club's activities involved live storytelling, whereas the activity in Lamb's
Chapel consisted of showing a film. Id. Likewise, the Court indicated that the Club's activities
were not any more religious than the student publication in Rosenberger. Good News, 202 F.3d
at 2101-02.
288. Id. at 2102.
Despite our holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court of Appeals, like
Milford, believed that its characterization of the Club's activities as religious in nature
warranted treating the Club's activities as different in kind from the other activities
permitted by the school. The "Christian viewpoint" is unique. according to the court,
because it contains an "additional layer" that other kinds of viewpoints do not. That is,
the Club "is focused on teaching children how to cultivate their relationship with God
through Jesus Christ," which it characterized as "quintessentially religious." With these
observations, the court concluded that, because the Club's activities "fall outside the
bounds of pure 'moral and character development,"' the exclusion did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination.
Id. Citing Judge Jacobs's dissent, the Court:
[D]isagree[d] that something that is "quintessentially religious" or "decidedly religious
in nature" cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and charac-
ter development from a particular viewpoint. What matters for purposes of the Free
Speech Clause is that we can see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of
Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other
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Finding that Milford had not raised a valid Establishment Clause
claim, the Court did not address whether the Establishment Clause
might outweigh the club's interest in gaining equal access to the
school's facilities.2 89 Defining the relevant community as the parents
rather than the school children, the Court found no realistic danger
that the community would think the government was endorsing relig-
ion or any particular creed.2 90 As in Lamb's Chapel, the activity was
not held during school hours, was not sponsored by the school, and
attendance was not limited on the basis of religious beliefs. 291
1. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia stated that he did not
believe that religious worship in a limited public forum would violate
the Establishment Clause if it was purely private expression. 292 Be-
cause he characterized Good News' speech in this case as purely pri-
vate expression, he agreed with the majority's result.293 Additionally,
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority that the regulation in ques-
associations to provide a foundation for their lessons. It is apparent that the unstated
principle of the Court of Appeals' reasoning is its conclusion that any time religious
instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and character, the discussion is simply
not a "pure" discussion of those issues. According to the Court of Appeals, reliance on
Christian principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other founda-
tions for thought or viewpoints do not. We, however, have never reached such a
conclusion.
Id.
289. Id. at 2107. The Court rejected the Establishment Clause defense in Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar as well. See supra notes 129-142 and accompanying text. In Good News. the case was
only at summary judgment stage in the proceedings. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099: see supra
note 264.
290. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., concurring). With respect to the impressiona-
bility of young children, the Court noted that it had never held that private religious activities
must be barred from school facilitates during nonschool hours due to the fact that elementary
school children may be present. Id. at 2104-05. Moreover, the Court found it unlikely that
children would believe the school endorses this activity. Id. at 2106. The Court specifically
noted that the time of day, directly after school, was not relevant, and "consistent with Lamb's
Chapel and Widmar, the school could not deny equal access to the Club for any time that is
generally available for public use." Id. at 2103.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2107-08.
293. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2108 (Scalia. J., concurring). Justice Scalia also found no
coercion:
Physical coercion is not at issue here: and so-called "peer pressure." if it can even be
considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities, one of the attendant con-
sequences of a freedom of association that is constitutionally protected. What is at play
here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas-and the private right to exert and
receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is protected by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, not banned by the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 2107 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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tion discriminated against religious viewpoint .294 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia indicated that even if Good News' speech were religious wor-
ship, such speech would still not be excludable from the limited public
forum.
2 9 5
[W]e have previously rejected the attempt to distinguish worship
from other religious speech, saying that "the distinction has [no] in-
telligible content," and further, no "relevance" to the constitutional
issue. Those holdings are surely proved correct today by the dis-
senters' inability to agree, even between themselves, into which sub-
category of religious speech the Club's activities fell. If the
distinction did have content, it would be beyond the courts' compe-
tence to administer. And if courts (and other government officials)
were competent, applying the distinction would require state moni-
toring of private, religious speech with a degree of pervasiveness
that we have previously found unacceptable. I will not endorse an
approach that suffers such a wondrous diversity of flaws. 296
2. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, joined the Court's opinion "to
the extent that [it is] consistent with the following three observa-
tions. ' 297 First, government neutrality with respect to religion is only
one factor considered in determining whether an Establishment
Clause violation occurred.298 When the activity involves children, a
child's perception that a public school endorses religion is also a fac-
tor, one that may "prove critically important. ' 299 Second, in this case,
"the critical Establishment Clause question here may prove to be
whether a child, participating in the Good News Club's activities,
could reasonably perceive the school's permission for the club to use
its facilities as an endorsement of religion. ''300 Finally, as the issue
294. Id. at 2108. Justice Scalia noted that Milford did not require sterility of speech from any
other groups but Good News. Id. at 2109. He characterized the regulation as "blatant viewpoint
discrimination," because the Club cannot say why children should be good and moral ("because
God wants and expects it") whereas other groups like the Boy Scouts can say children should be
moral, "because parents ... expect it, [or] because it will make the scouts 'better' and 'more
successful people' .... " Id.
295. Id. at 2110.
296. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2110-11 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted, italics as in
original). Justice Scalia noted, however, that the Court has "drawn a different distinction-be-
tween religious speech generally and speech about religion-but only with regard to restrictions
the State must place on its own speech. where pervasive state monitoring is unproblematic." Id.
at 2111.
297. Id, at 2111 (Breyer, J., concurring).
298. Id.
299. Id,
300. Id. Although not explicitly referenced, Justice Breyer applied the "effect" leg of the
Lemon test:
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presented to the Court was only whether Milford was entitled to sum-
mary judgment, "the Court cannot fully answer the Establishment
Clause question this case raises, given the procedural posture. '30 1
3. Justice Stevens's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the public may use
Milford's facilities for educational and recreational purposes, but re-
ligious purposes were expressly excluded.30 2 Justice Stevens, however,
divided speech for religious purposes into three categories. 30 3 First,
Justice Stevens recognized that some religious speech is speech about
a particular topic from a religious point of view, as in Lamb's
Chapel.30 4 This type of speech may not be constitutionally excluded
from a limited public forum. 30 5 Second, Justice Stevens indicated that
some religious speech amounts to worship, as in Widmar.30 6 This sec-
ond category of speech, according to Justice Stevens, should be ex-
cluded from limited public forums.30 7 Finally, he recognized an
"intermediate category that is aimed principally at proselytizing or in-
culcating belief in a particular religious faith. '308 Under this frame-
work, Justice Stevens described the question in Good News as
whether the school could "create a limited public forum that admits
The time of day. the age of the children, the nature of the meetings, and other specific
circumstances are relevant in helping to determine whether, in fact, the Club "so domi-
nate[s]" the "forum" that, in the children's minds, "a formal policy of equal access is
transformed into a demonstration of approval."
Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2111 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 2111-12. Justice Breyer explained, as the Court did not, that:
To deny one party's motion for summary judgment, however, is not to grant summary
judgment for the other side. There may be disputed "genuine issue[s]" of "material
fact," particularly about how a reasonable child participant would understand the
school's role. Indeed, the Court itself points to facts not in evidence, identifies facts in
evidence, which may. depending on other facts not in evidence, be of legal significance.
and makes assumptions about other facts. The Court's invocation of what is missing
from the record and its assumptions about what is present in the record only confirm
that both parties, if they so desire, should have a fair opportunity to fill the evidentiary
gap in light of today's opinion.
Id. at 2112 (citations omitted).
302. Id. (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
306. Id. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's indication of
some difficulty in monitoring what is and is not worship).
307. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2112.
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the first type of religious speech without allowing the other two. 309
Justice Stevens concluded that it could. 310
Justice Stevens identified the purpose of excluding religion here as
only to exclude religious speech that inculcates, rather than viewpoint
discrimination. 31I As Good News' activities fell into the third cate-
gory of religious speech, they may constitutionally be excluded from
the limited public forum. 312 However, Justice Stevens noted that even
if he agreed with the majority with respect to the type of exclusion
(viewpoint or content), he would not decide whether Milford raised a
valid Establishment Clause claim because this issue was not addressed
in the lower courts. 313
4. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, also dissented,
pointing out that the Good News Club did not challenge Milford's
restriction against using the school for religious purposes, only the ap-
plication of the policy, claiming that it resulted in viewpoint discrimi-
nation. 314 Justice Souter agreed with the Appellate Court's distinction
of Good News from Lamb's Chapel, finding that the Good News Club
309. Id. at 2113.
310. Id. at 2112-13. Obviously, Justice Stevens did not find it impossible to distinguish be-
tween religious viewpoint and religious subject matter. See id. at 2112-14 n.2 (quoting Buirkle v.
Hanover Ins. Cos., 832 F. Supp. 469, 483 (D. Mass.1993) (stating that "[a] perceptive observer
sees a material difference between the light of day and the dark of night, and knows that differ-
ence to be a reality even though the two are separated not by a bright line but by a zone of
twilight."). More specific to this analysis. Justice Stevens indicated that:
[Dlistinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the one hand. from religious
proselytizing, on the other, is comparable to distinguishing meetings to discuss political
issues from meetings whose principal purpose is to recruit new members to join a politi-
cal organization. If a school decides to authorize after school discussions of current
events in its classrooms, it may not exclude people from expressing their views simply
because it dislikes their particular political opinions. But must it therefore allow organ-
ized political groups-for example, the Democratic Party, the Libertarian Party, or the
Ku Klux Klan-to hold meetings, the principal purpose of which is not to discuss the
current-events topic from their own unique point of view but rather to recruit others to
join their respective groups? I think not. Such recruiting meetings may introduce divi-
siveness and tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine the school's
educational mission. School officials may reasonably believe that evangelical meetings
designed to convert children to a particular religious faith pose the same risk. And. just
as a school may allow meetings to discuss current events from a political perspective
without also allowing organized political recruitment, so too can a school allow discus-
sion of topics such as moral development from a religious (or nonreligious) perspective
without thereby opening its forum to religious proselytizing or worship.
Id. at 2113.
311. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2114 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 2114-15.
314. Id. at 2115-16 (Souter. J.. dissenting).
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intended to conduct religious worship, not merely to discuss a secular
subject from a religious viewpoint.315 He indicated that the majority
avoided this conclusion only by over-generalizing the activity in ques-
tion, concluding that "[i]f the majority's statement ignores reality,
then today's holding may only be understood in equally generic terms.
Otherwise this case would stand for the remarkable proposition that
any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as
a church. '31 6
Finally, Justice Souter asserted that the Court was wrong to act as a
court of first instance in reviewing Milford's Establishment Clause
claim. 317 Emphasizing that Milford's policy would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause if a reasonable observer would view it as an endorse-
ment of religion, Justice Souter recognized that facts presented to this
Court were insufficient to make a determination.318 However, he
stated that "[w]hat we know about this case looks very little like
Widmar or Lamb's Chapel.' '319 Finally, Justice Souter disagreed that
the relevant inquiry in this case was a reasonable parent's perception,
believing instead that the focus should be on the children's perception
of state-endorsed religion.320
IV. ANALYSIS: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND LIMITED
PUBLIC FORUMS AFTER GOOD NEWS
First Amendment rights are most likely to conflict in limited public
forums. 321 There are probably few conflicts between First Amend-
ment rights outside the limited public forum because private exercises
of free speech or free religion are not likely to be confused with gov-
ernment establishment of religion in a traditional public forum or a
private forum. When private speech takes place in a private forum,
Establishment Clause concerns are not raised as the government has
no involvement. Generally, freedom of speech protects the right to
say whatever one wants in a private forum, as well as in a traditional
public forum.322 Freedom of religion protects the right to practice
whatever religion one wants in private, as well as in traditional public
315. Id. at 2116.
316. Id. at 2116-17.
317. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2117-18 (Souter, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 2118-19.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2119 n.4.
321. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing limited public forums).
322. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing permissible restrictions on
speech in traditional public forums).
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forums. 323 However, when private speech takes place in limited pub-
lic forums, citizens may question whether and to what extent the gov-
ernment endorses such speech by allowing the use of the forum.
When the government endorses or funds private religious speech, Es-
tablishment Clause concerns are raised. 324
Although the Court in Good News held that the school district had
not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim,325 the Court's decision
potentially has great effect on Establishment Clause theory. Given
Good News, can the government successfully justify viewpoint dis-
crimination in a limited public forum if it believes such discrimination
is necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause, or will the
Court always fail to find a valid Establishment Clause claim to avoid
having to confront the question of whether Establishment Clause val-
ues trump free speech and free exercise values? In Widmar, Lamb's
Chapel, and Rosenberger, the Court stated, but did not decide, that
Establishment Clause concerns may overcome the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination. 326 Is the Court backing away from this
proposition?
A. Raising a Valid Establishment Clause Claim-The Test
In Good News, as in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court
held that Establishment Clause concerns did not justify viewpoint dis-
crimination. 32 7 However, in each case, the Court found that the gov-
ernment had failed to "raise a valid Establishment Clause claim. '328
Although Gentala was remanded in light of Good News, it was de-
cided on Establishment Clause grounds, rather than viewpoint-subject
matter discrimination grounds. 32 9 In Gentala, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested, but did not decide, that
323. As with freedom of speech, there may be very limited situations where other concerns
override the freedom. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Oregon could deny unemployment compensation when employee
was fired for ceremonial ingestion of peyote, because such ingestion was not protected by the
free exercise clause).
324. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing government speech) and notes
97-120 and accompanying text (discussing the funding and endorsement factors in the analysis of
Establishment Clause violations).
325. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2103.
326. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
327. Good News v. Milford Central Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001); Rosenberger Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
328. See supra notes 127-176, 246-260, and 285-320 (discussing Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger,
and Good News).
329. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1082. See also supra notes 228-245 (summarizing the Gentala
decision).
[Vol. 52:125
IS GOOD NEWS NO NEWS?
the restriction in question discriminated against viewpoint. 330 How-
ever, the court held that even if the restriction discriminated against
viewpoint the city's Establishment Clause concerns justified the re-
striction.331 As a result of the remand, the district court is likely to
decide, and the Ninth Circuit is likely to confirm, that the restriction
does indeed discriminate against viewpoint. However, there is no rea-
son to believe that the Ninth Circuit will decide any differently on the
Establishment Clause issue. As such, the Gentalas might soon be pe-
titioning for certiorari to the Supreme Court on the question of
whether the Establishment Clause can justify viewpoint discrimination
in a limited public forum.
The Gentalas will not be alone. In light of Good News, more lower
court decisions are likely to be decided on Establishment Clause
grounds. The Good News decision showed even more clearly than
Lamb's Chapel the level of preaching that the Court is willing to label
religious viewpoint rather than subject matter. Consequently, more
regulations prohibiting religious worship or instruction will be tested
on Establishment Clause grounds rather than subject matter-view-
point discrimination grounds. And those litigants unsuccessful in the
circuit courts will file petitions for certiorari asking the Court to de-
cide whether the Establishment Clause can justify viewpoint discrimi-
nation. If the Court ever decides whether the Establishment Clause
can justify viewpoint discrimination, that decision may be coming
soon. A necessary precursor to such a decision is that the Supreme
Court finds that the government has raised a valid Establishment
Clause claim. As such, the question of what constitutes a valid Estab-
lishment Clause claim in the eyes of the Court is of the utmost
importance.
1. Factors
Although the city in Lamb's Chapel offered the Establishment
Clause as justification for its restriction on speech, the Court quickly
dismissed the claim. 332 The Court referred to the Lemon test without
really applying its three parts.333 The Court spent only slightly more
effort in analogizing the restricted speech in Widmar to that in
330. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1073.
331. Id. at 1073-74, 1082.
332. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. See also Timothy K. Hall, Constitutional Conflict.- The
Establishment Clause Meets the Free Speech Clause in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District, 45 MERCER L. REV. 875. 878 (1994): Joanne Kuhns, Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: The Supreme Court Shall Make No Law Defining
An Establishment of Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1599, 1657 n.386 (1995).
333. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395, where the Court noted that:
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Lamb's Chapel, mentioning concerns both about perceived govern-
ment endorsement and benefits to religion. 334
In contrast to Lamb's Chapel, the Court examined the Establish-
ment Clause defense more thoroughly in Rosenberger.335 There the
Court described the neutrality of government programs as a key fac-
tor in determining whether the Establishment Clause had been vio-
lated. 336 The Court especially noted that because the program was
neutral with respect to religion, the student assessment that funded
the program was "a far cry from a general public assessment designed
and effected to provide financial support for a church. 337
Additionally, the Rosenberger Court examined government en-
dorsement of religion, concluding that by allowing Wide Awake Publi-
cations (WAP) to participate in the program, "'the government has
not fostered or encouraged' any mistaken impression that the student
newspapers speak for the University. '338  Moreover, the Court
touched on funding concerns in attempting to distinguish the facts in
Rosenberger from a neutral program where "the government [was]
making direct money payments to an institution or group that is en-
gaged in religious activity," reinforcing the notion that "if the State
pays a church's bills it is subsidizing it, and we must guard against this
abuse. 339
Like Rosenberger, the Court in Good News more thoroughly ex-
amined the factors that might support an Establishment Clause de-
[A]s in Widmar, permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series in-
volved in this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-
part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman: The challenged governmental action has a
secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhib-
iting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Id. (citations omitted).
334. Id.
We have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of the claimed de-
fense on the ground that the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation are
unfounded. The showing of this film series would not have been during school hours,
would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public,
not just to church members. The District property had repeatedly been used by a wide
variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would
have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was
endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church
would have been no more than incidental.
Id.
335. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-44.
336. Id. at 839.
337. Id. at 841.
338. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette. 515 U.S. 753, 766
(1995)).
339. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842, 844.
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fense. 340 Although the Court quickly analogized the restricted activity
to the activities in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar to dismiss Milford's
Establishment Clause defense, 341 the Court thereafter explicitly dis-
cussed neutrality, coercion, and endorsement in support of its deci-
sion.342 Funding was not at issue in Good News.
a. Neutrality
As in Rosenberger, the Good News Court began its analysis by rec-
ognizing neutrality as a "significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of [an] Establishment Clause attack. ' 343 Because
the Court had determined that the subject matter of the Good News
Club's speech was morality taught from a religious viewpoint, the
Court found that the club sought "nothing more than to be treated
neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other
groups. " 3 4 4
Although the Court has never found neutrality to be the determina-
tive factor in its Establishment Clause analysis, it has labeled neutral-
ity a "key factor" in Rosenberger and a "significant factor" in Good
News.345 Additionally, in Good News, the Court stated that because
"allowing the club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutral-
ity, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the
Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Good News Club. '346
Because the Court in Good News found the coercion and endorse-
ment concerns insignificant and there was no funding concern, the
weight of neutrality in comparison to the other factors remains to be
seen.
b. Coercion and Endorsement
Having found the program neutral, and stating that Milford "faces
an uphill battle" to show the Establishment Clause required the
340. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2103-07.
341. Id. at 2103.
The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this case. As in Lamb's Chapel,
the Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and
open to any student who obtained parental consent, not just to Club members. As in
Widmar, Milford made its forum available to other organizations. The Club's activities
are materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Thus.
Milford's reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing.
Id.
342. Id. at 2104-07.
343. Id. at 2104.
344. Id.
345. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
346. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2104.
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school district to exclude the Good News Club from its limited public
forum, the Court dismissed the factors of coercion and endorsement
with ease. 347 With respect to coercion, 348 the Court stated that "to the
extent we consider whether the community would feel coercive pres-
sure to engage in the [c]lub's activities, the relevant community would
be the parents, not the elementary school children," 349 because the
Good News Club required parental permission for children to
attend.350
Although such a statement may too readily dismiss the effect on
school children 35 1 the statement is more disturbing because of the
phrase "to the extent that we consider." The phrase suggests that the
Court will not necessarily consider coercion; however, coercion was
the key factor in Lee.352 In fact, the Court distinguished Lee from the
facts in Good News because in Lee, the Court found attendance at
graduation obligatory.353 It is hard to imagine that the Court will not
consider coercion as a factor in the Establishment Clause analysis
when the coercive pressure to attend is as great as in Lee. The doubt
the Good News Court places on the use of coercion as a factor in
Establishment Clause analysis is probably unintended. 354 Therefore,
although the Court found the coercive pressure in Good News to be
insignificant, the Court's Establishment Clause analysis does still en-
tail coercion as a factor.
With respect to endorsement,3 5 although the Court reluctantly rec-
ognized that school children might view the use of the school as the
school's endorsement of religion, it did not consider this danger as
being "any greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostil-
ity toward the religious viewpoint if the club were excluded from the
347. Id. at 2104-07.
348. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text (discussing coercion in Establishment
Clause analysis prior to Good News).
349. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2104 (citations omitted).
350. Id.
351. See James L. Underwood, Applying the Good News Decision in a Manner that Maintains
the Separation of Church and State in Our Schools, 47 VILL. L. REv 281, 282 (2002) (noting that
"as soon as the opinion was issued, alarm bells were rung by those concerned that schools would
be turned into religious battlegrounds and small children would be subjected to hard-sell, intimi-
dating evangelism.").
352. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
353. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2104.
354. But see id. at 2107 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that only physical coercion, not peer
pressure, counts toward the Establishment Clause analysis).
355. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text (discussing endorsement in Establish-
ment Clause analysis prior to Good News).
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public forum." 356 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer in concurrence,
who would not have decided the Establishment Clause question at
this summary judgement stage in the litigation, stated that "a child's
perception that the school has endorsed a particular religion or relig-
ion in general may also prove critically important. '357 Thus a clear
majority of the Court confirmed that perceived endorsement was a
factor in an Establishment Clause claim, although individual justices
reached different results in applying this factor.358
c. Funding
As noted, funding was absent from the Supreme Court's analysis in
Good News.359 The only funding involved would have been for main-
tenance of the facility. The Court had earlier dismissed such a funding
claim in Rosenberger stating that "[i]f the expenditure of governmen-
tal funds is prohibited whenever those funds pay for a service that is,
pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by a group for sectarian
purposes, then Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel would have to
be overruled. '360
The Court has not yet found a strong enough funding concern in a
limited public forum to hold that such funding constituted an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. Although the Court has repeatedly stated
that government may not pay a church's bill,36 1 it has not yet made
clear what this means. At one end of the spectrum, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has made clear that government may provide
basic services such as police and fire department services to religious
356. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2106. With respect to school children's perceived endorsement,
the Good News Court referred to applying the Establishment Clause here as a "heckler's veto,"
further emphasizing its concern with protecting free speech:
We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's
veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what the
youngest members of the audience might misperceive. There are countervailing consti-
tutional concerns related to rights of other individuals in the community. In this case,
those countervailing concerns are the free speech rights of the Club and its members.
And, we have already found that those rights have been violated, not merely perceived
to have been violated, by the school's actions toward the Club.
Id. (citations omitted).
357. Id. at 2111 (Breyer, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Scalia believes that there
is never government endorsement of a message delivered in a limited public forum. See supra
notes 292-295 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 356-357 and infra notes 358-365 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (discussing funding in Establishment
Clause analysis prior to Good News).
360. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843.
361. See, e.g., id. at 844.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
organizations. 362 Additionally, government may also extend property
tax credits to such organizations. 363
The funding in Rosenberger seems to be approaching the other end
of the spectrum. The level of funding in Lamb's Chapel and Good
News was slight, as the only government expenditure was for the
maintenance of government facilities necessary as a result of the addi-
tional use of the forum. 364 The Court also dismissed the funding con-
cern in Rosenberger where the student fee was used for WAP's
printing costs, stressing that the reimbursement for printing costs was
provided on a religion-neutral basis.365 The Rosenberger Court recog-
nized that the State paying for a church's bills would constitute gov-
ernment endorsement of religion. 366 However, the University had
certified WAP as a CIO, thus classifying it as something other than a
religious organization. 367 Additionally, the Court held that the publi-
cation constituted religious viewpoint rather than religious subject
matter.368 As the Rosenberger Court found both religious viewpoint
and a secular organization, the Court easily concluded that the pro-
gram in question did not amount to paying a church's bill.
2. Lemon Test
However else the Good News decision may affect Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, it may be seen as putting another nail in
Lemon's coffin. In holding that Milford had not raised a valid Estab-
lishment Clause concern, the Lemon test was as notably absent from
the Good News Court's analysis as it was from the Rosenberger
Court's. Of course, the standing of Lemon does not matter if the
Court in fact applied other factors even when it explicitly referenced
Lemon,369 but Lemon's repeated absence from the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause analysis suggests that Lemon has been left by
the wayside.
Perhaps even more telling of the status of the Lemon test is that in
his concurrence in Good News, Justice Breyer applied the effects leg
of Lemon, but referenced not Lemon, but Ball, which cited Lemon:
362. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, at 671 (1970).
363. Id. at 673-74.
364. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098: Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387.
365. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842-44.
366. Id. at 844.
367. Id. at 823-26.
368. See supra notes 143-176 and accompanying text (discussing the Rosenberger decision).
369. See, e.g., supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's inconsistent
use of the Lemon test, particularly in Lamb's Chapel).
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Second, the critical Establishment Clause question here may well
prove to be whether a child, participating in the Good News Club's
activities, could reasonably perceive the school's permission for the
club to use its facilities as an endorsement of religion. "[A]n impor-
tant concern of the effects test is whether ... the challenged govern-
ment action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadher-
ents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. '370
Additionally, in this formulation and in Justice Breyer's application,
the effects test sounds much like the endorsement factor that the
Court has more consistently applied.
3. Justice Scalia's Test/Interpretation
Although Justice Scalia has seemingly been successful in junking
Lemon, he did not seem to be able to find any buyers for his Estab-
lishment Clause test. In Lamb's Chapel, Justice Scalia ended his con-
currence with the statement, "I would hold, simply and clearly, that
giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities
cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because it does not signify
state or local embrace of a particular religious sect. ' 371 This statement
seemed to suggest that government may embrace religion, as long as it
does not endorse one religion over another. Justice Scalia's peculiar
views on government endorsement of religion are asserted more
strongly in Good News where he stated,
As to endorsement, I have previously written that "[r]eligious ex-
pression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public
forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." The
same is true of private speech that occurs in a limited public forum,
publicly announced, whose boundaries are not drawn to favor relig-
ious groups but instead permit a cross-section of uses. In that con-
text, which is this case, "erroneous conclusions [about endorsement]
do not count. '372
Obviously, Justice Scalia's view is more extreme than the Court's as
he would disregard any consideration of perceived endorsement in
limited public forums. 373 As such, Justice Scalia's definition of purely
private speech does not depend on whether a reasonable viewer may
perceive the speech as government-endorsed, but he makes no effort
to clarify how else to judge what is purely private speech. In any case,
370. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2111 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)).
371. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 401.
372. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2107-08 (citations omitted, brackets in original).
373. See supra notes 355-358 and accompanying text.
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as protective as the Court is of speech, Justice Scalia's proposed test is
even more protective. However, it is not clear whether his disregard
of Establishment Clause concerns stems merely from a desire to pro-
tect speech or to also protect religion as he faulted the dissenters for
trying to distinguish between acceptable and excludable religious
speech in limited public forums.
B. Limiting Speech in a Limited Public Forum After Good News
With the Good News decision, as with Lamb's Chapel and Rosen-
berger, the Court was clearly trying to avoid limiting speech. Bans on
broad categories of religious speech not only chill speech but also may
discriminate based on viewpoint and against religion. In a limited
public forum, any restriction on speech must be reasonable in relation
to the purpose of the forum and must not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.374
1. Reasonableness of the Restriction
Reasonableness is a fairly low threshold, especially if the best fit is
not necessary. 37 5 The Court in Good News did not even find it neces-
sary to review the reasonableness justifications.376 The Court's lack of
review is especially telling of the value of the reasonableness criterion
because in Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme Court faulted the Second Cir-
cuit for not addressing the reasonableness of the regulation.377 Hav-
ing been reprimanded in Lamb's Chapel, the Second Circuit made a
laundry list of reasonableness justifications in Bronx Household and
referred to this same list in its Good News decision. 378 The laundry
374. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on speech in limited
public forums).
375. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
376. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100.
377. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 211 (discussing the Bronx Household court laundry list). In its Good
News decision the Second Circuit stated that:
[Tlhe Club argues that the restriction is unreasonable because Milford's articulated
purpose for the restriction-"ensuring that students in its charge are not left with the
impression that [it] endorses religious instruction in its school, or that it advances the
beliefs of a particular religion or group thereof"- is unpersuasive. It argues that there
is little risk that children would confuse the Club's use of school facilities with the
school's endorsement of the religious teachings. This argument is foreclosed by prece-
dent. In Bronx Household of Faith, we stated that "it is a proper state function to
decide the extent to which church and school should be separated in the context of the
use of school premises." Furthermore, "it is reasonable for state legislators and school
authorities to avoid the identification of a . . . school with a particular church." Al-
though we made this pronouncement in the context of an organization requesting to
conduct church services in a school, we believe it is equally applicable to the case now
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list passed the Court's inspection without comment, making the crea-
tion of such a list appear to be an exercise in futility. Unless the laun-
dry list met some criterion the Court has not seen fit to specify, only
the most poorly written opinions could not pass such a threshold.
Although the Good News Court did not need to review both rea-
sonableness and viewpoint discrimination to hold the regulation inva-
lid, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to reserve the review of
the reasonableness of justifications. The Court did not make any ref-
erence to the reasonableness justifications, whereas when the Court
reserves review of an issue or assumes a statement's truth without de-
ciding, the Court has made a practice of explicitly stating its inten-
tion.379 The low threshold of reasonableness review, coupled with the
Court's absence of comments, suggests that the Court will only attack
reasonableness when no showing has been made.
2. Viewpoint Discrimination
Unlike reasonableness, the Court closely reviews whether a restric-
tion discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. This is clear from the
Court's opinions in Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News.380
In each case, accepting the Court's characterization of the speech in
question, the regulation resulted in viewpoint discrimination.
The facts in Lamb's Chapel did seem to suggest that the subject
matter of the film was child rearing.381 The limited public forum had
already hosted similar subject matter.38 2 Therefore, the exclusion of
the film clearly constituted viewpoint discrimination because the only
basis for excluding the film was the religious viewpoint from which the
before us. The Club argues that it is not a "particular church," but rather a nondenomi-
national Christian organization. This difference, however, is immaterial. The activities
of the Club clearly and intentionally communicate Christian beliefs by teaching and by
prayer, and we think it eminently reasonable that the Milford school would not want to
communicate to students of other faiths that they were less welcome than students who
adhere to the Club's teachings. This is especially so in view of the fact that those who
attend the school are young and impressionable.
Good News, 202 F.3d at 509. The Supreme Court does address the impressionability of school
children but only with regard to the validity of the city's Establishment Clause concerns, not with
regard to the reasonableness of the regulation. See supra notes 87 and 290 and accompanying
text.
379. See, e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-01I v. Falvo, 122 S. Ct. 934. 938 (2002): Toyota
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 689 (2002); Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2001)
(referencing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134. 162
(1980)) Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2001).
380. See supra notes 129-163 and 284-291 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 129-142 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 130-143 and accompanying text.
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acceptable subject matter of child rearing was presented. The Court
unanimously agreed on this point. 383
The subject matter of the publication in Rosenberger was somewhat
less clear. Although a majority of the Court accepted that the publica-
tion merely presented Christian viewpoints, four dissenters believed
that the subject matter was clearly preaching.384 Interestingly, under
University rules, CIO status, and thus the opportunity for reimburse-
ment, could not be granted to a religious organization. 38 5 Because
WAP had already been granted CIO status, the University had al-
ready conceded that the purpose of WAP was something other than
"practic[ing] a devotion to an ultimate . . . deity. ' 386 As such, the
University may have had an uphill battle in its argument that the pur-
pose of WAP's publication was something other than preaching.
Nonetheless, four members of the Court strongly believed this was the
case.
38 7
WAP stated that its mission was "to challenge Christians to live, in
word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ
means. ' 388 If the subject matter of such a publication could be charac-
terized as something other than preaching or religious instruction, it
would seem to be at the far end of the subject matter-viewpoint
continuum.
However, the pendulum in Good News seems to have swung even
farther toward defining speech restrictions as viewpoint rather than
subject matter. While WAP's publication might have conceivably dis-
cussed secular subject matter from a religious viewpoint, the Good
News Club's activity is surely religious worship and instruction. 38 9
The majority in Good News, as in Rosenberger, glossed over the
facts to conclude that the restriction constituted viewpoint discrimina-
tion. Additionally, the majorities in each case seemed to suggest that
there is no distinction between viewpoint and subject matter discrimi-
nation with respect to religion. As such, it becomes more difficult or
impossible to exclude religious instruction or worship from many lim-
ited public forums. If a limited public forum allows classes, it must
383. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
384. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
385. See supra notes 143-163 and accompanying text.
386. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828.
387. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
388. See supra note 165.
389. See supra note 256. For a discussion of how the Court came to conclude that the subject
matter was morals presented from a religious viewpoint see infra notes 410-422 and accompany-
ing text.
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also allow religious classes. If it allows clubs focusing on the moral
development of youth, it must also allow Good News Clubs, despite
the explicit religious worship included in their programs. 390
The dissent recognized that the Good News Court was only able to
characterize Good News' activity as "teaching of morals and charac-
ter, from a religious standpoint" through the use of "generic terms."
The use of generic terms evidences the Court's reluctance to decide at
what point religious content becomes religious viewpoint. By shifting
toward religious viewpoint, rather than religious content, the Court
increases the government's burden when it tries to exclude religious
worship and instruction from limited public forums. Both the
overgeneralization of the facts and the Court's apparent refusal to
draw a line between religious viewpoint and religious content suggest
that the Court is providing more protection to speech, and here, relig-
ious speech in particular. 39'
a. Too Hard to Draw the Line?
With Good News, the line between religious content and religious
viewpoint seems to have moved, resulting in no difference between
the two. 392 Is the Court giving up?
390. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2115-17 (Breyer. J., concurring: Souter. J., dissenting) (indicat-
ing that the holding of Good News could be read much more narrowly). See supra note 301 and
accompanying text. Because the action was for summary judgement, these Justices suggested a
narrow holding that in this case reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was content or
viewpoint discrimination. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2115-17. Justice Souter's suggestion may
have been somewhat wistful, recognizing that this was clearly not the majority's intent. Id. at
2117 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that, "[t]he majority avoids this reality only by resorting to
the bland and general characterization of Good News's activity as 'teaching of morals and char-
acter, from a religious standpoint.' If the majority's statement ignores reality, as it surely does.
then it may be understood only in equally generic terms.") (citations omitted).
391. As the reasonableness/viewpoint-neutral test was a speech test in the first place, the test
presumably already placed the proper amount of restriction on speech. Apparently. the Court
has found the test is too restrictive of religion. Of course, if the Court's point is that allowing
religious subject matter into a limited public forum only matters if that religious subject matter
raises an Establishment Clause concern, that point is well taken. However, it denies the typical
limited public forum rule of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality. If this was the Court's
point, then wasn't the proper analysis to overrule the restriction on reasonableness grounds. i.e.
the exclusion of religious subject matter is not reasonable? The Court's blurring of religious
viewpoint and religious subject matter seems to allow a wider spectrum of religious subject mat-
ter than necessary if the restriction had been overruled on reasonableness grounds. Perhaps, as
Justice Souter suggested in his dissent, the majority intended "this case [to] stand for the remark-
able proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a
church, synagogue. or mosque." Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2117 (Souter. J.. dissenting).
392. See supra notes 380-391 and accompanying text. Strangely enough. there are only three
dissenters in Good News. where there were four in Rosenberger. However. Justice Breyer, who
dissented in Rosenberger. concurred in Good News only because he viewed the issue as whether
Milford was entitled to summary judgement. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
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The majority in Good News characterized the subject of the Good
News meetings as the teaching of morals from a religious viewpoint. 393
The dissents looked more closely at the activities that went into this
endeavor: group prayer, rewards for learning and reciting scripture,
and the encouragement of professing a belief in God.394
The majority of the Court declared the club's speech was not "relig-
ious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values," but rather
the teaching of moral values from a religious viewpoint.395 This con-
clusion suggests that religious worship, in order to be considered sub-
ject matter rather than viewpoint, must be completely divorced from
any permissible subject matter. This in turn suggests that the majority
largely agreed with Justice Scalia in that there is little difference be-
tween subject and viewpoint discrimination with respect to religion.396
The Court, finding the line hard to draw or nonexistent, chose to err
on the side of free speech. Ideologically, it is hard to argue with this
choice. Practically, however, the difficulty with the majority's position
is twofold. First, the Court is in the business of line drawing. 397 Jus-
tice Stevens, in dissent, proposed a scheme with which to draw the line
between viewpoint and content with respect to religious speech. 398
Second, in refusing to draw a line between religious viewpoint and
religious worship, in its effort to protect both speech and religion, the
Court moves dangerously toward the establishment of religion.
Did the Supreme Court shift the line between religious viewpoint
and religious subject matter because of a belief that government and
lower courts have had too much trouble distinguishing between view-
point and content discrimination with respect to religion, sometimes
to the harm of religion or speech? While protecting free speech and
free religion is a noble goal, the Court in Good News nearly forecloses
further development of common law by suggesting that religious view-
point and religious content are so intertwined as to be inseparable.
Even though Good News could be confined to a narrow holding
that summary judgement for Milford was not yet appropriate, it seems
Therefore, the sides can still properly be viewed as 5-4, with Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer disagreeing with the majority with respect to whether the restriction in question
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, and whether such discrimination might be justified by the
Establishment Clause.
393. See supra notes 284-291 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 302-320 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
396. Good News, 202 F.3d at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring).
397. See Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 847.
398. See supra notes 302-313 and accompanying text.
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to suggest much more.399 The Court's broader holding, that religious
worship must be completely divorced from permissible subject matter
to be permissibly excluded from a limited public forum, is premature
in two respects. First, the Court's role is to let lower courts fully de-
velop issues. Here, the issue of the distinction between religious view-
point and religious subject matter is still quite young. Lower courts
are still trying to decipher the meanings of Lamb's Chapel and Rosen-
berger. Secondly, the issue in Good News itself was not yet fully de-
veloped due to the stage in the proceedings.400 The question of
whether there was any difference between content and viewpoint with
respect to religion had not yet arisen, only the question of whether
reasonable minds could differ as to whether Good News' activities
were religious inculcation, rather than the teaching of morals from a
religious viewpoint.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens did not appear to have any trouble
drawing the line that the majority thought impossible or wrong to
draw.401 Far from giving up on distinguishing between permissible re-
ligious viewpoint and impermissible religious speech in a limited pub-
lic forum, Justice Stevens favorably cited Campbell stating that
"[u]nder the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a government entity
such as a school board has the opportunity to open its facilities to
activity protected by the First Amendment, without inviting political
or religious activities presented in a form that would disserve its ef-
forts to maintain neutrality. '40 2
Justice Stevens then provided courts with the tools to do so, divid-
ing speech for religious purposes into three categories. 40 3 First, Justice
Stevens categorized religious speech that consists of speech about a
particular topic from a religious point of view, indicating that such
speech may not be constitutionally excluded from a limited public fo-
rum.40 4 Second, he identified that religious speech amounts to wor-
ship, which he indicated should be excluded from limited public
forums. 40 5 Finally, he recognized an "intermediate category that is
aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular
399. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 302-313 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 164-176 (outlining
the Rosenberger dissent's argument that there is a difference between religious viewpoint and
religious content).
402. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 2112. See also supra notes 302-313 and accompanying text.
404. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
405. Id.
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religious faith. '40 6 Justice Stevens concluded that government can
constitutionally "create a limited public forum that admits the first
type of religious speech without allowing the other two. '40 7
Of course, drawing a line presumes that discriminating against relig-
ious content may be acceptable. Justice Scalia asserted that such dis-
crimination is not acceptable. 40 8 However, as stated above, if the
exclusion of content is not acceptable, the Court could hold the re-
striction unconstitutional under the reasonableness prong of the lim-
ited public forum analysis. 40 9 As reasonableness has historically been
a low threshold, this will require the Court to inquire more closely
into the reasonableness of governmental regulations of speech than
ever before.
b. Overgeneralization
In Good News, as in Rosenberger, the majority and dissent charac-
terized the speech in question much differently.410 As the dissents
pointed out in Rosenberger and Good News, the majority's overgener-
alization of the facts allowed them to analogize speech that not only
encouraged religious worship, but actually constituted religious wor-
ship, with secular speech. 411 Naturally, such a gloss over the facts led
to the majority's conclusion of viewpoint discrimination.
The Good News Club's meetings only became indistinguishable
from the speech in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger because the Court
characterized it as something other than merely religious worship. 412
Unlike the Supreme Court majority opinion, the appellate court
found the Good News Club's speech consisted of much more than
moral and character instruction because of the traditional trappings of
religious worship that were, according to the Fourniers, necessarily as-
sociated with the club. 413 Although the majority of the Supreme
Court, and Judge Jacobs who dissented from the Second Circuit's de-
cision, disagreed, distinguishing the instruction scout meetings from
the religious instruction and worship that take place during Good
News meetings is no overwhelming task. The Second Circuit simply
explained why Good News' attempt to analogize itself with scouts
was, or should have been, unsuccessful:
406. Id.
407. Id. at 2113.
408. See supra notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 375-380 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 143-176, 246-320 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 143-176, 246-320 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 280-283, 288 and accompanying text.
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While the Boy Scouts teach reverence and a duty to God generally,
this teaching is incidental to the main purpose of the organization,
which is personal growth and development of leadership skills.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Boy
Scouts require any particular means of demonstrating reverence
and duty to God. Similarly, the Girl Scouts vow to 'try ... [t]o serve
God and [their] country.' 41 4
Although the majority of the Supreme Court in Good News glibly
glossed over the facts, the dissent in the appellate decision, which the
majority of the Supreme Court decision favorably cites, did not.
Judge Jacobs' explanation, perhaps unintentionally, makes the differ-
ence between religious viewpoint and religious content in this case all
the more clear:
[t]he Fourniers argue that presentation of Christian morality entails
religious activities such as prayer, that their (religious) viewpoint on
the "secular" topic of morality cannot be expressed and promoted
without these religious activities, and that forcing them to do so
would prevent them from expressing their point of view, in violation
of the First Amendment. 415
Judge Jacobs pointed to the club's statement that the morals and val-
ues the Good News Club taught would be "senseless without Christ,"
leading Judge Jacobs to announce that "t]he distinction is especially
slippery where the viewpoint in question is religious, in part because
the sectarian religious perspective will tend to look to the deity for
answers to moral questions. ' 416 Judge Jacobs, however, failed to con-
sider that just because the club insisted that "these morals or these
values are senseless without Christ," did not mean prayer was neces-
sary to get this point across. 417 It simply meant that references to
Christ are necessary. Just as these references may be necessary, they
were clearly allowable as similar references to "God" were already
present in scouts.
Judge Jacobs, however, chose not to see that references to Christ or
God do not need to be the equivalent of prayer. Ignoring this simple
solution, Judge Jacobs instead concluded that "[a]lthough the religious
viewpoint thus has the tendency to overwhelm the secularity of a sub-
ject matter, this transformative, goal-directed tendency of religious
viewpoints does not justify a preference for other viewpoints. '418 This
statement once again appears to ignore the obvious: the Club's goal
was in fact preaching as opposed to moral development. Having ac-
414. Good News, 202 F.3d at 511 (brackets in original).
415. Id. at 514.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
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cepted that the subject matter is morals, Judge Jacobs further accepted
the argument that, in order to teach their particular brand of morals,
they must provide religious instruction and prayer.419
Finally, Judge Jacobs concluded that if it is impossible to decide
whether the club's activities are religious content or religious view-
point, the court should err in favor of free speech.420 It is hard to
argue with erring in favor of free speech; however, this necessity is not
as clear when the Establishment Clause is concerned. Additionally,
such an argument should be made while deciding whether the Estab-
lishment Clause should prevent the speech in question from taking
place in the limited public forum, 421 rather than while deciding
whether the restriction constitutes viewpoint or content discrimina-
tion. However, the Supreme Court apparently adopted Judge Jacobs'
position.4 22
C. Gentala Remanded
Like Campbell, Gentala has been remanded in light of Good
News.423 Unlike Campbell, the court in Gentala held that the restric-
tion on religious speech was justified by the Establishment Clause
grounds, whereas the court in Campbell did not reach the Establish-
ment Clause question because it held that the restriction on religious
speech did not amount to viewpoint discrimination. 424 The Court pur-
ported to grant certiorari in Good News to resolve the "conflict
among the circuits on the question whether speech can be excluded
from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of the
speech.'425 Because it cited Gentala as one of the conflicting cases,
the Court would seem to have agreed to decide whether the Establish-
ment Clause can justify the exclusion of religious speech from limited
public forums. However, because the Court found that Milford had
not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim, the Court did not reach
that question.
419. Id.
420. Good News, 202 F.2d at 515.
421. See infra notes 469-473 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 280-291, 389-391, and 410-422 and accompanying text.
423. Gentala v. City of Tucson. 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2000), remanded in light of Good
News. 122 S. Ct. 340: Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000), re-
manded in light of Good News.
424. Compare supra notes 219-227 and accompanying text with notes 228-245 and accompany-
ing text.
425. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099.
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The Court subsequently remanded Gentala in light of its Good
News decision.426 The remand is curious because the Court did not
decide whether a government's concern with violating the Establish-
ment Clause can justify viewpoint discrimination in a limited public
forum.
1. Remanded for Re-Assessment of the Establishment Clause Claim
At least one commentator, James Underwood, has asserted that the
Supreme Court remanded Gentala because "the Good News Club de-
cision requires examination of fees charged for use of public facilities
to ensure that there is no discrimination against religious organiza-
tions. ' 427 Underwood recognized that the appellate court decided
Gentala on Establishment Clause grounds, rather than on the ground
that there was no viewpoint discrimination.428
If the appellate court had decided Gentala on the grounds that the
restriction did not amount to viewpoint discrimination, then the re-
mand would simply require a reassessment of this determination. If
the restriction amounted to viewpoint discrimination, it is well estab-
lished that government funding is a means of discrimination and can-
not be withheld to silence religious viewpoint.42 9 However, because
the decision was based on Establishment Clause grounds, Under-
wood's suggestion that the Court remanded Gentala because of the
city's refusal to subsidize religious viewpoint must mean that the dif-
ferential funding should effect the appellate court's Establishment
Clause analysis. More precisely, Underwood interpreted the remand
to mean that the appellate court must determine whether the lack of
funding for this religious viewpoint is a greater Establishment Clause
violation than the perceived endorsement of the speech by the
government.
The Court's intent in remanding Gentala is not clear to this author.
Underwood may well have interpreted the remand correctly. The
Court, however, did not appear to modify the Establishment Clause
analysis from the Rosenberger decision.430 Additionally, funding was
not a concern in Good News.43' The Court simply did not give the
426. Gentala, 122 S. Ct. 340.
427. James L. Underwood, Applying the Good News Decision in a Manner that Maintains the
Separation of Church and State in Our Schools. 47 VILL. L. REv 281, 294 n.90 (2002).
428. Id.
429. See supra note 159.
430. See supra notes 327-368 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 359-368 and accompanying text.
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Gentala court more guidance to make its determination whether the
Establishment Clause demands or condemns funding in that case.
Additionally, the Court reserved the question of whether the Estab-
lishment Clause might justify excluding speech from a limited public
forum. 432 In Gentala, the funding is the metaphysical limited public
forum. If Gentala has been remanded for consideration of whether
funding violated the Establishment Clause, the remand suggests that
Good News spoke more directly to the Establishment Clause than it
appeared to. It also turns the Gentala decision on its head, in that
rather than being required to deny funding under the Establishment
Clause, the city may be required to provide funding under the Estab-
lishment Clause so as not to disadvantage religion.
2. Remanded for a Clear Holding That the Viewpoint
Discrimination was Justified by the Establishment Clause?
Alternatively, the Court may have remanded Gentala so the lower
court would clearly hold that the denial of funding constituted view-
point discrimination. If the Ninth Circuit's Establishment Clause
analysis remained unchanged, the result would be that the court
would find viewpoint discrimination was justified by the Establish-
ment Clause.
In Gentala, the city asserted that the speech was government
speech.433  Because government can discriminate against its own
speech based on viewpoint, 434 the city asserted that the denial of fund-
ing to the Gentalas would be constitutional, even if such denial consti-
tuted viewpoint discrimination. On the other hand, the Gentalas
asserted that the speech was private speech in a limited public forum;
therefore, the city could not discriminate based on viewpoint. 435
The court did not decide into which category the speech fell. 436
Rather, it skipped the categorization of the speech because it found
432. Good News. 121 S. Ct. at 2103.
433. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1072-73.
434. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
435. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1072.
The Gentalas' basic submission in this case is that the City's categorical exclusion of
events "in direct support of religious organizations" from Fund support impermissibly
infringes on the free speech rights of religious organizations such as the Prayer Com-
mittee, based on their religious point of view. The parties have therefore, quite under-
standably. argued vigorously about the free speech aspects, drawing upon different
strains of First Amendment doctrine concerning the role of government in supporting
communicative activity.
Id.
436. Id. at 1073-74.
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that in either case the Establishment Clause prohibited the city from
funding the religious speech in question.4 37
Were we required to select among the mutually exclusive Free
Speech Clause paradigms the parties propound-each leading under
currently prevailing First Amendment doctrine to a different result
concerning the City's authority to exclude speakers from a govern-
ment-provided subsidy because they are engaged in a prayer ser-
vice-the choice would be a difficult one. It is a choice we need not
make, however, in order to resolve this case. For, even assuming
that the Gentalas have the better of the battle of the paradigms, that
conclusion would not end the inquiry. Rather, as the Supreme
Court and this court have indicated repeatedly, the government
may decline to subsidize private religious speech when doing so
would violate the Establishment Clause, or, put another way, avoid-
ing a violation of the Establishment Clause is a sufficiently compel-
ling reason to justify government's exclusion of certain private
speech in a forum otherwise dedicated to communicative activity.
We therefore agree with the district court that if the City's Estab-
lishment Clause justification for the Civic Events Fund's religious
exclusion is valid, then the exclusion is valid as well. It is to the
Establishment Clause inquiry, therefore, that we now direct our
attention.4 38
It is not at all obvious that, if forced, the Court would decide that
the speech constituted private speech in a limited public forum rather
than government speech. 439 The court's Establishment Clause analy-
437. Id.
438. Id. (citations omitted).
439. See id. at 1073.
Each of these opposing characterizations of the City's role in developing and expending
its Civic Events Fund has some considerations in its favor. On the one hand. the City in
this case, like the university in Rosenberger, is administering a fund providing in-kind
services for a wide range of speakers. A large majority of speakers who meet the appli-
cable Civic Events criteria were in fact funded during the period for which there is
evidence in the record, so the very strong element of qualitative governmental selectiv-
ity involved in cases such as Finleyv (concerning the administration of the National En-
dowment for the Arts) or Forbes (concerning the editorial discretion necessary in
making journalistic decisions) is not present here. On the other hand. the criteria for
funding here are more selective than in Rosenberger. albeit not as selective and discre-
tionary as in Finley' and Forbes. That most projects are funded may evidence only self-
selectivity by event organizers aware of the applicable criteria or. more probably. the
availability of sufficient funds for the period in question, a circumstance that may not
always prevail. Additionally, the City's policy goals here are not, one might conclude,
similar to those of the university in Rosenberger: while the university was concerned
with assuring a vigorous interchange of ideas among students as part of the educational
process, the City is concerned with providing for its citizens and tourists events of cer-
tain kinds that the City believes enhance Tucson's ambiance as an attractive place to
live and visit. Because that is the goal. the City affirmatively identifies itself as the
sponsor of funded events, placing its imprimatur on the events in a manner somewhat
like the editor of an anthology does. while the university in Rosenberger did quite the
opposite.
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sis, however, assumed that the speech was private speech in a limited
public forum.440 The assumption is evident in the court's statement
that "the considerations... do become pertinent to our Establishment
Clause analysis, for they are informative in determining the degree to
which the city's fund program constitutes an endorsement of the pri-
vate speech involved. '441
Despite the court's assumption that the speech was private speech,
the court may not decide that the restriction constituted viewpoint dis-
crimination. It may find, instead, that the speech constituted govern-
ment speech or that the funding mechanism was viewpoint neutral,
despite the Good News holding.
If on remand the district court once again reaches the Establish-
ment Clause question, it will undoubtedly decide once again that the
Establishment Clause justifies the restriction.442 As noted above, the
Supreme Court has not directly modified the Establishment Clause
analysis. 443 Its modification is indirect, in that by potentially broaden-
ing the category of religious viewpoint, more cases will reach the ques-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 444 Perhaps this is the Supreme
Court's intent in remanding Gentala, forcing a direct clash of the free
speech value of no viewpoint discrimination with the Establishment
Clause value of no government endorsement of religion.
D. Setting Up the Test
The Ninth Circuit avoided deciding whether the Establishment
Clause justified unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by skipping
the issue of viewpoint discrimination and assessing the Establishment
Clause defense alone.445 The Supreme Court seems to require the
court to first decide whether the restriction constituted viewpoint dis-
crimination. 446 How much should the phrasing of the test impact the
result?
The courts in Bronx Household, Campbell, and Gentala all found
that the government's interest in not violating the Establishment
Clause outweighed individual free speech or free religion interest;
whereas the courts in Good Sports and Church on the Rock found no
Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1073 (citations omitted).
440. Id. at 1073-74.
441. Id. at 1074 n.14.
442. See supra notes 244, 327-368 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 327-368 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 380-391 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 433-444 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 433-444 and accompanying text.
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Establishment Clause violation at all.44 7 Likewise, in Good News the
Court clearly stated that the school district had not made a valid Es-
tablishment Clause claim.448 Although Good News was still only at
the summary judgment stage, and thus may yet make out a valid Es-
tablishment Clause claim, the Court seemed to have orchestrated the
facts and the issues to be able to make this finding. 449 Was the Court
taking refuge in this finding to avoid having to finally determine
whether the Establishment Clause trumps the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses?
Although the Court held that the school district had not yet raised a
valid Establishment Clause concern, the Court was not reluctant in
finding unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.450 Not only does
the Court's decision in Good News change the theory of viewpoint
discrimination, at least with respect to religious speech,45' but labeling
the restriction on religious speech as unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination suggests the Court is setting up a very high burden for the
government when it raises a valid Establishment Clause claim.452 Not
all viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional. For example, the gov-
ernment may discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when it speaks for
itself.453 Additionally, the Court had previously suggested in Rosen-
berger that viewpoint discrimination might be appropriate in a limited
public forum if it is necessary to prevent an Establishment Clause vio-
lation. 454 There was no suggestion that such viewpoint discrimination
would be unconstitutional and yet necessary to avoid a greater consti-
tutional violation of violating the Establishment Clause. Rather, Ro-
senberger seemed to indicate that when the proper case came, the test
would be the Court's traditional balancing test: Is the private interest
in free speech/free religion outweighed given the facts of that case by
447. See supra notes 177-245 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 289-291 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 410-422 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 286-288, 389-391 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 389-391 and accompanying text.
452. In Good News, although the Court purported not to decide whether an Establishment
Clause claim can justify viewpoint discrimination, its labeling the viewpoint discrimination as
unconstitutional places the burden quite high. Good News was decided at the summary judge-
ment stage. The effect of the Court's decision is to overturn the summary judgement ruling in
favor of the city, not to grant summary judgement for the club. Yet the Court's terminology
suggested it has already decided that the Establishment Clause cannot justify the restriction on
speech.
453. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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the governmental interest in avoiding a possible Establishment Clause
violation? 455
Could viewpoint discrimination be constitutional if it were neces-
sary to prevent an Establishment Clause violation? Is a constitutional
violation ever curable? The Court sets up a greater conflict between
freedom of speech or freedom of religion and the Establishment
Clause than necessary. 456 Because the Good News Court set up a no-
win situation, the only safety was in avoiding the issue.
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit in Gentala found no
free speech violation.457 The differences in the holdings may be attrib-
utable in part to the ways the courts set up the problem. Unlike the
Supreme Court, which began with the premise that unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination might be excused because of Establishment
Clause concerns, 458 the Ninth Circuit set up the problem as first decid-
ing whether the Establishment Clause justification was valid, and if it
was then concluding the exclusion from the limited public forum was
valid, avoiding the issue, and label, of unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. 45 9
V. IMPACT: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
FREE SPEECH AT ODDS
Despite the official separation of church and state, religion has
never been completely absent from our federal government.460 Some
455. See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 469-473 and accom-
panying text.
456. See supra notes 445-455 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 228-245 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
459. In holding that the city's Establishment Clause concern justified the viewpoint discrimi-
nation, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We agree with Tucson that although the Establishment Clause remains a "blurred, in-
distinct and variable barrier" to government support for religious activity, "the circum-
stances of [the] particular relationship," between Tucson and recipients of Civic Events
Fund support is such that Tucson was correct in concluding that the requested funding
would have fallen on the Establishment Clause side of that "serpentine" wall. Tucson's
decision to refuse Civic Events Fund support to the prayer service's organizers there-
fore did not run afoul of another First Amendment proscription, against abridging free-
dom of speech.
Gentala, 244 F.3d. at 1067 (citations omitted).
460. See, e.g., Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1067 n.1 (discussing the National Day of Prayer). The
Ninth Circuit stated that:
It is worth noting at the outset that this case does not concern the constitutionality of
the Congressionally-established National Day of Prayer. Congress first proclaimed
such an annual "day" in 1952, as it has issued innumerable other resolutions proclaim-
ing national "days." It does not appear that there is any federal government funding or
support for any National Day of Prayer events the National Day of Prayer Task Force
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obvious examples include our currency, imprinted with "in God we
trust," the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, and Christ-
mas, which is recognized as a federal holiday. The Good News deci-
sion further blurs the line separating church and state by moving the
line between subject matter and viewpoint discrimination with respect
to religion. 461 This, in turn, will present more opportunities for courts
to decide whether and when the Establishment Clause might silence
religious viewpoint in a limited public forum. 462
For example, Gentala was already decided on Establishment Clause
grounds and is likely to be decided the same way again.463 The Su-
preme Court's remand suggests that the denial of funding to the
Gentalas constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 464  Under the Estab-
lishment Clause, the denial of funding may be necessary to prevent a
Establishment Clause violation. 465 Therefore, the denial of funding
may be found unconstitutional under a Free Speech analysis,466 but
required under an Establishment Clause analysis. In Gentala, if the
that promotes participation in the event is a private, nonprofit organization. Nor is the
National Day of Prayer in any respect sectarian (although its very point is to favor
religion over nonreligion). The original congressional resolution, the 1988 amendment
fixing the first Thursday in May as the National Day of Prayer, and the Task Force all
stress that the Day is meant as an opportunity for all Americans who wish to do so to
pray according to their own faith, not to promote any particular religion or form of
religious observance.
Id. (citations omitted) (parenthesis in original). See generally Theresa V. Gorski, Kendrick and
Beyond: Re-establishing Establishment Clause Limits on Government Aid to Religious Social
Welfare Organizations, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 171 (1990) (discussing government aid to
religious organizations that perform social services).
461. Underwood, supra note 351, at 287.
The direct impact of the Good News case is to blur the line separating church and state.
An indirect effect, probably unintended by the Court, could be to furnish an argument
fortifying the line of separation between church and state against pressure to further its
eradication. When the political tom-toms are beating their loudest, claiming that relig-
ion has been banned from the public schools, and when in a dazzling display of post
hoc. ergo propter hoc reasoning everything from sun spots to crab grass is blamed on its
absence, and school-sponsored religious observances are advocated as a curative, we
can now say: 'What ban? We've got equal access.' Equal access can lead to student and
parental choice rather than the pressure of official observances.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
462. After Good News, if governments wish to keep groups that practice religious indoctrina-
tion, such as the Good News, out of their limited public forums, they will need to draft their
regulations creating those limited public forums more carefully. Avoiding discriminating against
religious viewpoint, opening a limited public forum to a wide variety of community activities,
and prohibiting groups which practice religious indoctrination from using the limited public fo-
rum will be tantamount to walking a tight rope.
463. See supra notes 423-444 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 423-444 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 423-444 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 421-459 and accompanying text.
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speech takes place in a limited public forum, rather than being gov-
ernment speech, and if the Court grants certiorari, how will the Court
ultimately decide?
By finding that the restriction in Good News constituted viewpoint
discrimination, the Court invariably allows more religious speech into
limited public forums. This in turn may force the development of lim-
ited public forum Establishment Clause arguments. Although Rosen-
berger purported not to decide whether the Establishment Clause
could justify viewpoint discrimination, the Court stated that there is
no Establishment Clause violation "in honoring duties under the Free
Speech Clause." This strongly suggests that in a case like Gentala,
where religious speech was restricted to prevent an Establishment
Clause violation due to perceived government endorsement of relig-
ion, simply showing a valid Establishment Clause concern in restrict-
ing the speech may be insufficient to save the restriction.
Censorship is clearly not the answer because silencing religious
speech is as much of an Establishment Clause violation as sanctioning
religious speech. 467 Other options that have been suggested to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause when religious speech is expressed
in limited public forums include balancing the restriction in question
against the perceived government endorsement and issuing a
disclaimer.468
A. First Principles-Balancing
In his dissent in Widmar, Justice Byron R. White suggested that the
Court should return to first principles because of "the difficulty in rec-
onciling the various interests expressed in the Religion Clauses. '469
This requires an assessment of the burden on respondents' ability
freely to exercise their religious beliefs and practices and of the
State's interest in enforcing its regulation. Respondents complain
that compliance with the regulation would require them to meet
,about a block and a half' from campus under conditions less com-
fortable than those previously available on campus. I view this bur-
den on free exercise as minimal. Because the burden is minimal,
the State need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation
furthers some permissible state end. The State's interest in avoiding
claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting religious wor-
ship-in maintaining a definitive separation between church and
State-is s-.:ch an end . . . I believe the interest of the state is suffi-
467. See infra note 479 and accompanying text.
468. See infra notes 469-482 and accompanying text.
469. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 288 (White. J.. dissenting).
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ciently strong to justify the imposition of the minimal burden on
respondents' ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs.470
Justice White's return to first principles sounds much like the
Court's traditional balancing test. If the Court were to adopt a bal-
ancing test, the Ninth Circuit's Gentala decision is likely to survive.
The burden on the speech was minimal, as the activity took place as
planned at only slightly more cost to the speakers than if the city had
provided some reimbursement of costs. 471 However, if the Gentalas
had not had the necessary funds, the activity may not have taken
place, resulting in a chilling effect. The Court has been reluctant to
chill speech, especially religious speech whose silencing also implicates
the Free Exercise Clause. 472 This reluctance suggests that if the choice
in a balancing test is to silence religious speech or risk perceived gov-
ernment endorsement of such speech, free speech concerns will pre-
vail over Establishment Clause concerns. 473 Perhaps then, disclaimer
is the answer.
B. Disclaimer
Several cases and scholars have suggested that a disclaimer can ex-
pel the perceived government endorsement of the religious mes-
sage.474  Would a disclaimer be enough or even acceptable? A
470. Id. at 288-89.
471. See supra notes 228-245 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing religion as speech): notes 129-
142 and accompanying text (discussing Lamb's Chapel): notes 143-176 and accompanying text
(discussing Rosenberger): notes 246-320 and accompanying text (discussing Good News).
473. See supra notes 420-422 and accompanying text.
474. See Underwood, supra note 351, at 294 n.89 (noting suggestions in Widmar. 454 U.S. at
274 n.14. and Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251, which indicate that the Court may approve of disclaimers
to prevent "erroneous impressions of state sponsorship."). Underwood also suggested that
schools could limit perceived endorsement by making the time for the limited public forum later
in the day rather than immediately after dismissal, or by providing a wide choice of activities so
that religious activity is not the exclusive choice at any time.
The key point is that the Good News Club opinion requires equal access rather than
meeting every demand a religious organization may make of a school system. The gra-
vamen of Milford's violation was 'exclusion of the Club from use of the school.' Grant-
ing access, however, does not mean guaranteeing the Club a pool of students from
which to recruit its members, so long as it is given the same opportunity to attract
members as other organizations. The Court concluded that granting access to the Club
immediately after classes would not violate the Establishment Clause. This, however, is
not the same as saying the Club has to be given access at that time. The time given to
the Club must be on a par with that given to other organizations. It could not be given
a time that creates artificial barriers for those who wish to attend or that places the
Club at a competitive disadvantage with other organizations. It is well established that
a government agency creating an open or limited public forum may impose reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions that are content neutral. The Court in Good News
Club noted that the record did not show that the school had offered an alternate time
20021
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disclaimer would have the benefit of silencing less speech, but may not
completely dispel the Establishment Clause concern that government
may be supporting religion. This would be especially true when fund-
ing is concerned. A sign stating that the government does not endorse
the Gentalas' message would hardly alleviate a separationist's alarm
at knowing that the government provided funds to allow the Gentalas
to conduct a prayer session. 475
Moreover, the disclaimer may be perceived as discriminating
against religious speech. The disclaimer may initially appear to allow
government to be neutral with respect to religion in terms of provid-
ing funds or facilities for all speech without regard to possible relig-
ious content, thus avoiding the Establishment Clause violation of
preventing the free exercise of religion. However, if the religious mes-
sage is the only message singled out for the special treatment, a rea-
sonable observer is likely to perceive that the message has a special
stigma attached to it. Thus, the selective disclaimer may not be as
neutral in practice as in theory.
Although encouraging the use of disclaimers, commentator James
Underwood recognized their limitations. With respect to the use of
schools as limited public forums, Underwood suggested that "[t]he
school also could deter misconceptions of state sponsorship by issuing
a disclaimer. Such disclaimers, however, must be scrupulously neutral
with no hint of favoring or punishing any particular organization or
type of organization. ' '476 In practice, creating such a disclaimer may
be difficult or impossible.
Underwood further suggested that "any aura of state financial spon-
sorship can be avoided by charging a reasonable fee that is directly
geared to the cost of providing the facilities to outside users, uniform
to the Club, and that [i]n any event, consistent with Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, the
school could not deny equal access to the Club for any time that is generally available
for public use.' This statement implies that the school, even if it has opened its facilities
to the public, could declare certain times, such as immediately after the close of classes.
when the school would not be available to outsiders so long as the rule is applied even
handedly. This statement also implies that if this scheduling is done, reasonable alter-
native times should be afforded on a non-discriminatory basis. This, however, does not
mean a time at which a pool of students is ready and waiting, so long as no other group
is given such an advantageous time. Thus, the school could create a temporal cordon
sanitaire at which no meetings conducted by outside groups are permitted, but such
groups are given reasonable alternate times. This would avoid outside groups taking
advantage of the pool of students created by the compulsory school attendance laws
and negate any impression that the clubs are part of the state-sponsored curriculum.
See Underwood, supra note 351 at 291-93 (footnotes omitted).
475. See supra note 104 (stating that although funding and endorsement concerns overlap.
such an overlap is not necessary).
476. See Underwood, supra note 351. at 294.
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to all such users, and not designed to deter use of the facilities. '47 7
While this may solve the perceived endorsement problem in most lim-
ited public forums, it will be inadequate in a scenario similar to
Gentala where the limited public forum in question consisted only of
city funding.
Finally, using a disclaimer raises its own Establishment Clause con-
cern through what may be viewed as excessive government involve-
ment with religion and censorship. 478 After all, the Establishment
Clause calls for government to stay out of religion as well as for relig-
ion to stay out of government. As recognized in Rosenberger,
[I]deas ... would be both incomplete and chilled were the Constitu-
tion to be interpreted to require that state officials and courts scan
the publication to ferret out views that principally manifest a belief
in a divine being .... As we recognized in Widmar, official censor-
ship would be far more inconsistent with the Establishment Clause's
dictates than would governmental provision of secular printing ser-
vices on a religion-blind basis.4 7 9
While it is clear that censorship is not the answer, a disclaimer is
difficult because it may entail government entanglement with religion.
Government would have to preview the speech in question to deter-
mine whether it would disclaim involvement. Additionally, a dis-
claimer may send a message of governmental disapproval. 480 Finally,
a disclaimer only alleviates the Establishment Clause endorsement
concern; it does nothing to alleviate the funding concern.
The inadequacy of the disclaimer, however, depends on the pro-
gram itself. Perhaps, if the funding in Gentala created a limited public
forum rather than government speech,481 it created a forum where it
would be impossible to avoid either unconstitutionally discriminating
against religion or unconstitutionally directly funding a religious mes-
sage. The restrictions on the forum were of the city's creation. The
answer to the conundrum of religious speech in limited public forums
may be that the burden should lie with the government to ensure that
the forum created is capable of conforming to constitutional bounds.
As one commentator, Leslie Jacobs, noted,
[E]ven applying the Establishment Clause endorsement precedents
leads to the conclusion that the government almost always has the
ability to structure its forum-either by initial design or dis-
claimer-to avoid reasonable misapprehensions of endorsement.
477. Id.
478. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45.
479. Id.
480. See supra notes 475-476 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 433-437 and accompanying text.
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That it chooses not to do so should not provide authority for the
government to discriminate among subsidized speakers.482
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court seems to require limited public forums to allow religious
indoctrination whenever those forums allow general or moral instruc-
tion.48 3 Therefore, the Court will soon be faced with the question of
whether preaching is to be allowed in limited public forums.484 The
Court has failed to state whether viewpoint discrimination can be jus-
tified.48 5 However, by labeling religious indoctrination as viewpoint
rather than subject matter, the Court will soon be asked to make that
determination by weighing the constitutional values of free speech
against no establishment.
It would have been a simple matter to label the religious instruction
in Good News religious content, which could then have easily been
siphoned out of a limited public forum. By labeling it as unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination, the Court gives insight into its likely
holding when the question arises as to whether religious worship can
be excluded from a limited public forum. 48 6
Not only did the Good News Court avoid finding a First Amend-
ment conflict by identifying the issues as it did, 48 7 the majority's gloss
over the facts allowed the Court to brush over any potential Establish-
ment Clause violation.4 8 Deciding whether a government program
violates the Establishment Clause involves close attention to de-
tails,489 however, the Good News Court glibly swept any details with
respect to the activities of the club under the table. 490
It might sound natural for the Court to suggest that religious wor-
ship cannot be excluded from a limited public forum that allows in-
struction. The suggestion that a limited public forum must also double
as a church is quite disturbing.491 Now that the Supreme Court has
held that the restriction against religious indoctrination in a limited
482. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1399
(2001). See also Brief for Petitioners, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093
(2001) (No. 99-2036) (recognizing that a restriction on subject matter could be twisted to silence
disfavored speech).
483. See supra notes 389-422 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 423-445 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 445-459 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 410-422 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 302-320 and accompanying text.
489. See Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1068 (stating "the devil is ... emphatically in the details.").
490. See supra notes 410-422 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 207-218 and accompanying text.
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public forum that allows the teaching of morals amounted to uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination, will the Establishment Clause
prevent a limited public forum from being used for religious worship?
Since the Supreme Court has never decided this issue, it will have to
be developed by the circuit courts.492 So the Good News decision,
while considerably blurring the already blurry distinction between re-
ligious viewpoint and religious subject matter, 493 is simultaneously
forcing the Establishment Clause issue to a head.
Laura Gastel*
492. See supra notes 460-468 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 380-422 and accompanying text.
* The author would like to thank her family and friends for their support and
encouragement.
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